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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation analyzes the differences between private and non-private firms in two contexts.  
Chapters 1 and 2 examine the electricity industry in the United States and the motivation behind 
electric utilities’ usage of demand side management programs.  The first chapter focuses on load 
management programs, which decrease electricity demand during the peak hours of the day.  It 
looks into the impact of a plausibly exogenous decrease in natural gas prices on the utilization 
and capacity of these programs.  The second chapter analyzes the relationship between electricity 
market deregulation and electric utilities’ energy efficiency activity.  The third chapter 
investigates the impact of Chinese enterprise restructuring on employment, wage bills, and 
productivity.  All three chapters show that different objectives due to ownership type lead to 
differences in firm behavior. 
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1. Three Empirical Essays on Energy and Labor 
Economics 
 
 
 
This dissertation examines the differential impact of ownership type on firm decisions, 
specifically comparing private and non-private firms.  The first two chapters analyze how private 
and non-private utilities in the United States differ on their usage of electricity conservation 
programs, also known as demand side management (DSM) programs.  These chapters examine 
the motivation behind the usage of DSM programs and the roles of cost minimization and 
regulatory pressure.  The third chapter of this dissertation investigates firms that transition from 
state-owned to privately-owned in China from 1998 through 2006.  It looks at the impact of 
restructuring on labor market outcomes, including employment, wage bills, and labor 
productivity. 
To explain in more detail, the first chapter examines the impact of a decline in natural gas 
prices on the usage and capacity of electric utilities’ load management programs (which decrease 
usage of electricity during peak hours of the day).  On a day when electricity demand is high, 
utilities can choose to increase their supply of electricity by running an additional gas power 
plant or they can opt to decrease the demand of electricity by employing a load management 
program.  Due to the role of natural gas plants and load management programs in meeting peak 
demand, the two can be seen as substitutes.  Using a change in natural gas prices due to 
advancements in mining technology, a difference-in-differences methodology is employed to 
determine the motivation behind why utilities use and maintain load management programs.  
These programs are costly to run and one hypothesis is that these programs are used when they 
are the more cost effective method of meeting peak demand.  An alternative hypothesis is that 
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utilities are under regulatory pressure to use and maintain these programs.  The results indicate 
that following a decline in natural gas prices, non-private utilities that generate their own 
electricity will decrease the usage of their load management programs by approximately 2 
percent of peak summer demand.  Load management program size is estimated to decline by 5 
percent of peak demand for non-private utilities when gas prices fall.  These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis of cost minimization and provide some empirical evidence that 
gas generation and load management programs are substitutes for meeting peak demand.  For 
private utilities, the results are not statistically significant. 
The second chapter analyzes electricity market deregulation and its impact on utilities’ 
energy efficiency activity (which decreases energy usage during all hours of the day).  This 
chapter seeks to determine the motivation behind electric utilities’ energy efficiency activity, 
specifically analyzing the role of regulatory pressure.  During the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
several states deregulated their electricity markets.  The push for a change in market structure 
was due to pressure to increase competition in order to decrease electricity prices.  This paper 
uses the change in the regulatory environment, which occurred in some states but not others, to 
analyze the impact of deregulation on electric utilities’ energy efficiency activity.  The results 
indicate that following a change in market structure, private utilities decreased their energy 
efficiency activity by approximately 200,000 MWh per utility, an amount of electricity that is 
roughly equivalent to a natural gas plant running at full capacity for a year. 
The third and final chapter of this dissertation explores labor market outcomes in China 
for state-owned enterprises that transitioned to privately-owned from 1998 through 2006.  In the 
mid-1990s, the Chinese government introduced a policy intended to privatize small and medium-
sized state-owned enterprises while retaining ownership of larger state-owned firms.  Using a 
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propensity score matching difference-in-differences methodology to address the issue of 
selection bias, employment, wage bills, and productivity are examined before and after 
restructuring occurred.  The results show that firms that transition from state-owned to privately-
owned decrease their employment on-average by approximately 7 percent, reduce total real 
wages by 7 to 10 percent on-average, and increase labor productivity (measured as sales per 
worker) by 11 to 26 percent on-average following a change in ownership structure.  The 
employment and wage effects fade over time, while the productivity effects persist for a longer 
period of time. 
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2. The Impact of Natural Gas Prices on Utilities’ 
Load Management Program Usage and Capacity 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In recent decades, following the deregulation of electricity markets, the California 
Electricity Crisis, and the development of more sophisticated technology, many residential 
customers and those in the electricity industry have been advocating for different ways to lower 
electricity prices and promote energy conservation.  The push for discovering ways to manage 
electricity efficiently has continued to grow recently due to concerns about climate change.  In 
2012, the electricity sector was responsible for 32 percent of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 
the United States, making it the largest source of GHG emissions in the U.S.1  It was also the 
single largest source of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the U.S., contributing 38 percent of 
the nation’s total CO2 emissions.2 
In an attempt to solve the problem of increased electricity demand and in turn greater 
fossil fuel combustion, some policymakers have focused on the supply side of the equation and 
tried to promote clean energy and renewable forms of energy generation.  Developing 
technologies have led to an increase in solar, wind, and other renewable sources of energy as 
well as a shift away from traditional fossil fuels such as coal.  Furthermore, around 237 gigawatts 
(GW) of natural gas generation capacity was added between 2001 and 2010 to keep up with the 
growing demand for electricity.3  This made up over 80 percent of capacity added during that 
time period.  Of the 237 GW of new capacity, 75 GW were new combustion turbine plants, 
which are primarily used during the peak hours of the day, while the remaining units consisted of 
1 http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/electricity.html 
2 http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/co2.html  
3 http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=2070 
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combined-cycle units, steam turbine plants, and other natural gas plants.4  Natural gas plants are 
particularly attractive for meeting growing demand because they produce fewer emissions than 
coal plants, have low construction times and low capital costs, and are relatively faster at starting 
and ramping up.5  At the same time, other policymakers have thought about solving the problem 
from the demand side of the equation.  Programs that focus on conservation from the demand 
side are broadly termed demand side management (DSM) programs.  One type of DSM program 
that is used during peak hours of the day is a load management (LM) program.  This paper looks 
at the substitutability of natural gas generation and LM programs in meeting peak demand and 
analyzes the motivation behind the usage and size of LM programs. 
Many demand side management programs in the United States started in response to the 
energy crises in 1973 and 1979.  While these programs have been in place for a few decades, 
there has been renewed interest in these types of programs following electricity market 
deregulation and the increase in energy prices across the country during the last decade.  DSM 
programs have been used in the industrial sector, but the recent push has been for 
implementation at the residential customer level.  DSM programs encompass both load 
management (LM) and energy efficiency (EE) activity.  Generally, load management refers to 
activities to curb energy consumption during the peak hours of the day or during high price 
periods.  Load management programs are sometimes referred to as demand response (DR) 
programs.  Customers who voluntarily decrease their demand for electricity during peak hours of 
the day are paid a dollar amount (usually per MW) by the utility or are compensated with a lower 
electricity rate.  Using data from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), Figure 
2.1 illustrates an hourly load curve for a summer day with and without a hypothetical load 
4 http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=2070 
5 http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=2070 
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management program.  The NYISO operates New York State’s electricity grid and manages the 
competitive wholesale electricity markets in the state.6  It collects hourly load data for all the 
electric zones in the state, as well as other information about market operation.  With a LM 
program, electricity demand is reduced during the peak hours of the day and increased during 
off-peak hours.  This is why some refer to load management programs as load shifting programs.  
The hypothetical load management program in Figure 2.1 reduces peak demand by 1,000 MW 
and increases demand in the off-peak hours by 1,000 MW.  Energy efficiency (EE), on the other 
hand, refers to efforts to reduce the amount of energy required to do certain activities and 
typically involves energy conservation across all hours of the day, not only during peak periods.  
While EE programs play an important role in energy conservation, the main focus of this paper is 
load management programs. 
Over the course of a day, there are variations in the price of electricity due to a number of 
different factors, including the weather and emergency outages of power plants or transmission 
lines.  In extreme cases, the electricity price in certain areas can exceed several hundred dollars 
per megawatt hour (MWh), causing spikes in the price.  Utilities cannot immediately pass on the 
cost to their customers, although they may adjust their tariff rates each quarter or year to account 
for the increasing price of electricity.  Load management programs can help solve the problem of 
high electricity demand and prices during peak periods as customers shift their demand from the 
peak period to an off-peak period.  An additional benefit of shifting load from peak periods to 
off-peak periods is the use of cleaner and more efficient power plants.  For example, due to wind 
patterns, wind plants generate more electricity at night than during the day.  So, if demand is 
shifted to off-peak hours, it can be met by wind plants rather than by running coal plants to 
generate the electricity demanded during peak hours. 
6 For more information on the NYISO, see http://www.nyiso.com/public/index.jsp  
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Load management programs lower the peak demand for energy, reducing the need to 
construct new, expensive generation units.  Therefore, a long-run benefit of using and 
maintaining a LM program is the avoided cost of siting new generation, which can be quite high.  
In the short-run, without load management programs, utilities would have to run their existing, 
more expensive units more often in order to meet the demand during peak hours.  Utilities are 
adding load management programs to their portfolio and pairing them with generation facilities 
to meet peak demand needs. 
This paper examines elements that have impacted the usage and capacity of load 
management programs in the United States during the last ten years.  It specifically focuses on 
electric utilities’ motivation behind using and maintaining these programs.  Utilities could be 
using these programs due to pressure from regulatory agencies or because they are the most cost 
effective option.  Not every utility has a load management program, and those that have a 
program vary both in the size of their programs and in their program utilization.  Using empirical 
evidence, this analysis focuses on utilities that have load management programs and analyze 
whether the motivation behind LM program usage and size is cost minimization via the 
substitution between the utilization of natural gas plants and LM programs during the peak hours 
of the day.  To examine this, an exogenous decrease in natural gas prices during the late 2000s is 
exploited and a difference-in-differences estimation technique is employed. 
The findings imply that there is substitutability between gas generation and both the 
usage and capacity of load management programs for non-private utilities.  Following a gas price 
decrease, the results imply that non-private utilities with generation will decrease their usage of 
the load management programs by 1.51 percent to 1.95 percent of their peak summer demand.  
Using program capacity as the dependent variable yields similar results – non-private utilities 
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with generation decrease the size of their programs by 4.49 percent to 5.18 percent of their peak 
summer demand.  These results are statistically significant and support the hypothesis that 
utilities will use their load management programs less when an alternative becomes cheaper. 
For private utilities, the results are positive but not statistically significant for program 
usage and program capacity.  This does not mean that private utilities are not motivated by cost 
minimization.  However, the results suggest that other factors, such as regulatory pressure, may 
overwhelm the impact of cost minimization for these utilities. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section explains how supply and demand 
interact in the electricity market, defines several key terms related to LM programs, discusses the 
state of existing programs in the United States, and describes the relationship between natural 
gas generation and LM programs.  After that, the previous literature related to LM programs is 
summarized.  Then the theory behind a utility’s decision to choose to run a natural gas plant or to 
employ a LM program during the hours of peak demand is explained.  Included is a simple 
model of the utility’s cost minimization decision.  The section following that describes the data 
used.  Then the methodology for answering the research questions is explained, various 
regression specifications are described, and the results are presented.  Finally, some conclusions 
and policy implications from this research are offered. 
 
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Supply and Demand of Electricity 
Electricity is a unique commodity because it is an inelastically demanded good that 
cannot be stored at grid scale.  The production of electricity can sometimes be subject to short-
term capacity constraints because certain types of power plants take a longer amount of time to 
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start up.  The demand for electricity is highly variable and as a result, there are time periods 
when there is plenty of capacity available and the incremental costs only consist of fuel costs or 
operating and maintenance (O&M) costs.  On the other hand, during periods of high demand, as 
capacity gets tighter, higher cost units must be run, leading to sharp increases in the wholesale 
price of electricity.  As a result of increased demand, utilities are forced to use higher cost plants 
to meet their electricity demand. 
In order to prevent blackouts from occurring, the supply and demand of electricity must 
be balanced in real time.  To ensure that there is enough supply to meet demand, the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) sets a target reserve margin for each region 
of the country.  The reserve margin is defined as “the amount of unused capacity at the time of 
peak load, expressed as a percentage of expected peak demand”.7  For the summer 2014, the 
target reserve margins ranged from 15 percent in Texas to 38 percent in the Southwest Power 
Pool.  Demand side management programs can help reduce the expected peak demand in an area, 
and thus ensure that the reserve margin is at a safe level.  Load management programs also play 
a role in preventing blackouts and lengthy power outages due to excess demand.  Programs that 
are only used during emergency situations, such as when there is a sudden, unplanned generation 
outage, can be referred to as reliability-driven programs.  As DSM programs continue to grow, 
they play an increasingly important role in helping to maintain the balance between supply and 
demand. 
The constant changes in the supply and demand for electricity lead to different market 
clearing wholesale electricity prices every half-hour or hour.  The price faced by the customer 
also varies based on customer type.  There are different classifications of customers including 
residential, industrial, and commercial.  Industrial and commercial customers are more likely to 
7 More information on reserve margins can be found at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16791  
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be subject to time-of-use pricing, which passes on the cost for each hour of electricity generation 
and reflects more of the volatility in the electricity price.  However, the price that is passed onto 
the residential customer is the retail price, which in most parts of the United States is relatively 
flat with adjustments made only a few times a year.  Residential customers are subject to the 
highest average retail price.  In 2013, the average retail electricity price was 12.12 cents per 
kilowatt hour (kWh) while the prices for commercial and industrial customers were 10.29 and 
6.82 cents per kWh, respectively.8  Additionally, residential customers bring in the largest 
amount of revenue from retail sales of electricity.9  Several programs, including demand side 
management programs, have aimed to make the economic incentives of customers more 
accurately reflect the time-varying wholesale cost of electricity.  The sharp increases in prices 
could be dampened by price-responsive demand. 
2.2.2 Current Load Management Programs 
Although the broad category of load management programs exists throughout the 
country, the details of each program vary based on each specific utility and other factors, such as 
state regulations.  While LM programs are increasing in popularity, there is potential for further 
expansion, which could lead to additional reductions in peak demand and savings for utilities 
since they are not paying peak prices for electricity.  Utilities can either grow the existing 
programs or create new LM programs to expand the reach of these services.  As of 2010, existing 
DR programs in the U.S. have the capacity to offset 4 percent of U.S. peak demand.10  As a 
reference point, the 2010 non-coincident summer peak demand – “non-coincident” meaning that 
the peak demands in each region do not have to occur at the same time – for the continental U.S. 
8 Average electricity price data by sector are from the Electric Power Monthly, Table 5.3, which was released on 
March 21, 2014 and can be found at: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.cfm  
9 Electricity Power Monthly, Table 5.2, released on March 21, 2014; http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.cfm 
10 National Action Plan on Demand Response, p. 5 
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was 767,948 MW.11  Using this value for peak demand, it translates into a savings of 30,718 
MW.  This represents the generating capacity of roughly 30 nuclear power plants. 
The existing DR programs in the United States have been in place for several decades 
and are mostly reliability-driven programs.  As with electricity consumption throughout the 
country, there are significant geographical variations in the amount of existing demand response 
activity.  There are a number of different types of LM programs around the U.S. and their 
regulations vary at the state level.  California, Florida, and New England are areas with a 
significant amount of DR activity, while Alaska, Montana, and Wyoming have a low amount of 
activity. 
2.2.3 Relationship between Natural Gas Generation and Load Management Programs 
When utilities and independent system operators (ISOs) decide which power plants to run 
first to generate electricity, they use the plants with the lowest variable operating cost first.  The 
order in which the plants are used can be referred to as an electricity supply curve or a dispatch 
curve.  Baseload plants such as coal and nuclear plants are typically first used.  These are power 
plants that tend to be cheaper to run, have lower variable costs, and take a longer time to start up 
and ramp down.  Baseload plants usually run the full 24 hours every day with downtime only 
when there are maintenance outages.  Natural gas plants are towards the end of the generation 
queue because their marginal costs are higher than the baseload plants; so they are usually run 
last.12  Information on capacity factors for different types of power plants is available from the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).  Capacity factors measure how much electricity 
is generated relative to the amount the plant can produce based on its maximum capacity if it was 
11 Information on historical U.S. demand broken down by region and for the country as a whole can be found at: 
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/showtext.cfm?t=ptb0812a 
12 For an example of a hypothetical electric generator dispatch curve based on variable operating cost, see 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7590 
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fully operational during the same amount of time.13  The data indicate that average utilization of 
natural gas capacity increased from 2005 to 2010.  However, for a combined cycle natural gas 
plant, average utilization during peak periods is still only about 50 percent, and during off-peak 
periods the number drops to about 30 percent.14  A combined cycle unit consists of both a 
combustion turbine and a steam turbine.  It takes the waste energy produced by the combustion 
turbine and uses it as an input into a steam boiler.  This is then used by the steam turbine to 
produce additional electricity, resulting in an efficiency increase in the unit as a whole.15  Natural 
gas combustion turbines (NGCTs), which are typically used as peaking units, have an even lower 
capacity factor.  Their annual capacity factor has been around 5 percent for the time period from 
2008 to 2013.16  Using data from the EIA, Figure 2.2 displays the monthly capacity factors for 
NGCT generators from January 2012 through December 2013.  Looking more closely at the 
monthly capacity factors shows that NGCTs are being utilized more often in the hot summer 
months, which supports their hypothesized usage as peaking units.  As a reference point and for 
comparison purposes, using 2010 data, the Vogtle nuclear power plant, a large baseline plant in 
Georgia, has a capacity factor of 95 percent for the year.17 
If there is a day when the electricity demand is high and approaches the amount of 
electricity supply available and online, a utility could have several options for meeting the 
additional demand.  One option is running a natural gas plant.  Another option for utilities to 
meet the increased demand is to ask their customers who are participants in a LM program to 
reduce their load for an hour (or until the electricity demand is met and starts to decrease).  Due 
13 Additional information about capacity factors can be found on the EIA website, 
http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=187&t=3  
14 http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=1730 
15 http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/?id=electricity 
16 http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_6_07_a 
17 http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=1710 
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to their roles in meeting peak demand, these two options can be viewed as substitutes.  Running 
a gas plant increases the supply of electricity while encouraging customers to decrease their 
loads decreases the demand of electricity; however, the end result of meeting the increased 
demand of electricity is achieved regardless of the mechanism. 
Another channel through which gas prices could affect utilities’ load management 
programs is through costs.  There are three main categories of costs related to load management 
programs – incentive payments, direct costs, and indirect costs.  Incentive payments are 
monetary payments the utility gives to their customers for their participation in the load 
management program and to voluntarily curtail their demand during peak hours of the day.  
Direct costs exclude incentive payments and are the costs of implementing load management 
programs incurred by the utility.  The indirect costs account for administrative costs, marketing 
costs, and other costs that could not be identified with any particular DSM program category.  If 
there is substitution between natural gas generation and load management programs, one would 
expect a decrease in natural gas prices to lead to a decrease in incentive payments and direct 
costs related to load management. 
 
2.3 Previous Literature 
The literature on load management programs has been varied and mostly theoretical due 
to the limited experiments and residential programs conducted in the United States.  In the 
section that follows, a summary of the existing research on LM programs in the United States is 
provided.  Additionally, some of the empirical evidence related to how residential consumers 
behave in response to these types of programs around the country is examined. 
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Joskow (2006) discusses the U.S. electricity market and describes some of the market 
imperfections and institutional constraints that have caused peak wholesale prices and operating 
reserves to be below their efficient levels.  Regarding demand response, the study asserts that 
demand response should be integrated into the system in a way that is symmetrical to the 
treatment of supplies of energy, operating reserves, and capacity.  Additionally, Joskow (2006) 
discusses the theory of DR, including pricing and the best way to compensate for DR activity. 
To test the impact of DR programs on residential customer behavior, several pilot 
programs and experiments have been conducted in different areas of the United States.  Faruqui 
and Sergici (2010) provides a review of current existing demand response and dynamic pricing 
programs around the country.  It also provides a survey of the empirical evidence, focusing on 
fifteen “pilot programs, experiments and full-scale implementations of dynamic pricing of 
electricity” (Faruqui and Sergici, p. 2).  Dynamic pricing refers to allowing the price of 
electricity to vary with the cost of electricity.  Customers are charged a higher amount during 
peak periods when there is a higher demand for electricity, and a lower amount during off-peak 
periods when there are fewer customers using energy.  The pilot programs described by Faruqui 
and Sergici vary in their scope and geographic location. 
The study’s findings show that residential customers on the household level respond to 
higher prices by lowering their electricity usage.  The magnitude of price response varies 
depending on different factors, including “the magnitude of the price increase, the presence of air 
conditioning and the availability of enabling technologies such as two-way programmable 
communicating thermostats and always-on gateway systems that allow multiple end-uses to be 
controlled remotely” (Faruqui and Sergici, p. 2).  As a result, time-of-use rates, where customers 
are charged a higher price during peak periods and a lower price in off-peak periods, lead to a 
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decrease in peak demand between 3 to 6 percent.  Time-of-use pricing differs from real-time 
pricing because time-of-use pricing varies with peak and off-peak periods, but real-time pricing 
changes more frequently, at an hourly rate.  Critical-peak pricing (CPP) tariffs are pricing 
schemes with a similar structure to time-of-use rates.  One of the main differences is that 
customers are charged a different, higher rate during CPP events.  CPP events occur when the 
electricity grid is extremely strained due to high demand and are usually caused by increased air-
conditioning use on hot summer days or an unexpected electricity outage.18  Customers are told 
in advance about the CPP events, which helps them shift their demand to off-peak periods if that 
is what is desirable to them.  Faruqui and Sergici find that CPP tariffs lead to a drop in peak 
demand between 13 to 20 percent.  When pairing these pricing schemes with additional enabling 
technologies such as a home climate control system or a two-way communicating smart 
thermostat, the corresponding decrease in demand is even larger.  The peak demand declines 
associated with critical-peak pricing tariffs range from 27 to 44 percent. 
One specific example of a demand response experiment is the Pacific Northwest 
GridWise Demonstration Project.  The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, along with 
regional utilities and industry partners, conducted the Pacific Northwest GridWise 
Demonstration Project, which consisted of two separate DR studies: The Grid Friendly 
Appliance Project and the Olympic Peninsula Project.19  These projects collected data from 
March 2006 to March 2007 and tested smart grid technologies as well as whether consumers 
would play an active role in managing their energy consumption on the grid. 
The Grid Friendly Appliance Project installed a controller in 150 dryers and water heaters 
in homes in Yakima, Washington; Portland, Oregon; and the Olympic Peninsula in Washington.  
18 Details about CPP events are available at https://www.sdge.com/sites/default/files/documents/cpp_factsheet.pdf  
19 Additional information is available online at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory website. 
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This project found that everyday household appliances can automatically reduce energy 
consumption at critical moments when they are fitted with controllers that sense stress on the 
grid.  Meanwhile, the Olympic Peninsula Project, which consisted of 112 residential homes, 
found that homeowners are willing to adjust their individual energy use based on price signals 
provided via information technology tools.  Overall, the actions taken in both studies helped 
reduce pressure on the grid during times of peak demand, potentially preventing power outages 
during grid emergencies.  With these new technologies helping to integrate renewable energy 
onto the grid and reducing energy consumption during peak time periods, there is a projected $70 
billion reduction of new generation, transmission and distribution systems over a 20-year period. 
While the literature is growing due to experimental programs around the country, the 
literature lacks empirical analyses of the motivation behind utilities’ usage of DSM programs, 
particularly load management programs.  This paper seeks to fill in the gaps in the literature and 
provide an understanding of when utilities would use and maintain these programs. 
 
2.4 Theory 
Utilities operate with the goal of cost minimization.  Therefore, a utility will minimize its 
costs subject to certain constraints.  The main constraint for a utility is supplying enough 
electricity to meet the demand in each hour.  Its costs consist of fixed costs and variable costs.  
The fixed costs are paid at one time and are not recurring.  For example, once a utility purchases 
a power plant, it may continue to make payments on it, but the purchase of the power plant 
occurs at one point in time.  On the other hand, variable costs include costs that are subject to 
changes, such as fuel costs and various other operating and maintenance costs.  This is where a 
utility can lower its total costs. 
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When determining whether to run a natural gas power plant or to employ a LM program 
to meet its peak demand, a utility must take into consideration the different costs associated with 
each choice.  If the utility already has a natural gas power plant in its generation fleet, it only 
needs to consider the cost of natural gas and any other variable costs, such as paying workers to 
make sure the plant runs smoothly.  If a utility has already set up a LM program, the only 
variable costs are the incentive payments it would need to pay out to get customers to curb their 
energy use during peak hours.  Taking costs for both choices into consideration, if the cost of 
running the natural gas plant is lower than the cost of the LM program, then the utility will 
choose to use natural gas generation to meet its peak power needs.  Alternatively, if the price of 
natural gas is very high and it is cheaper to use a load management program, then the utility will 
employ its program instead of running its gas plants. 
Assume there are two time periods for electricity usage – a peak period (where the 
quantity demanded and price of electricity are higher) and an off-peak period (where the quantity 
demanded and the price of electricity are lower).  Each utility is subject to the constraint where 
the quantity of electricity supplied must equal the quantity of electricity demanded at all times.  
If this constraint does not hold and electricity demand is not met, then there will be blackouts.  In 
this simple model, electricity is only generated by gas generation or saved through load 
management programs.  In this model, the supply and demand constraints for the peak and off-
peak periods, respectively, are:  
[1]  𝑄𝑄1 =  𝑄𝑄�1 − ∆ 
[2]  𝑄𝑄2 =  𝑄𝑄�2 + ∆ 
 
Where Δ represents the load management shift (in MW), 𝑄𝑄1 is equal to the amount of electricity 
generated in the peak period, 𝑄𝑄�1 is the amount of electricity demanded in the peak period, 𝑄𝑄2 is 
equal to the amount of electricity generated in the off-peak period, and 𝑄𝑄�2 is the amount of 
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electricity demanded in the off-peak period.  The quantity of electricity generated in the peak 
period consists of baseload electricity and peak electricity, and can be represented as: 
[3] 𝑄𝑄1 = 𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵 + 𝑄𝑄1𝑃𝑃 
In equation [3], 𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵 is the amount of baseload electricity generated and 𝑄𝑄1𝑃𝑃 is the peak electricity 
generated in the peak period.  In the off-peak period, only baseload power is produced. 
 
Assuming that short-run costs are comprised only of costs related to gas generation and load 
management, they can be expressed as: 
[4] 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 =  𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵�𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵,𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺� + 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃�𝑄𝑄1 − 𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵,𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺� + 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵(𝑄𝑄2,𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺) + 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(∆) 
 
The costs associated with peak period gas generation, consists of two parts: CB is a function of 
the quantity of baseload electricity generated in the peak period, 𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵, and CP is a function of 𝑄𝑄1 −
𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵.   In the off-period period, the cost of gas generation, CB, is a function of the quantity of 
baseload electricity generated in that period, 𝑄𝑄2. In both the peak and off-peak periods, the costs 
are also a function of the price of natural gas, PG.  The LM costs, CLM, are a function of the 
amount of load that is reduced, Δ.  
 
Then the Lagrangian for the cost minimization problem is: 
 
[5]  𝐿𝐿 = 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵�𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵,𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺� + 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃�𝑄𝑄1 − 𝑄𝑄�1𝐵𝐵,𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺� + 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵(𝑄𝑄2,𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺) + 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(∆) + 𝜆𝜆(𝑄𝑄�1 − 𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺1 − ∆) +
𝑀𝑀(𝑄𝑄�2 − 𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺2 + ∆) 
 
The first-order conditions from this Lagrangian are: 
 
[6]  𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶
𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄1
− 𝜆𝜆 = 0 
 
[7] 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶
𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄2
− 𝑀𝑀 = 0 
 
[8] 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕∆
− 𝜆𝜆 + 𝑀𝑀 = 0 
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After rearranging the terms in the two first-order conditions above: 
 
[9] 𝜆𝜆 = 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶
𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄1
 
 
[10]  𝑀𝑀 = 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶
𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄2
 
 
Putting these two terms into the third first-order condition and rearranging terms: 
 
[11]  𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕∆
= 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶
𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄1
− 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶
𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄2
 
 
Equation [11] implies that a change in LM costs equals savings in generation. 
 
Using total differentiation, the above equation becomes: 
 
[12]  𝜕𝜕
2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕∆2
 𝑑𝑑∆= 𝜕𝜕
2𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄1𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺
 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 +
𝜕𝜕2𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄12
 𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄1 −
𝜕𝜕2𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄2𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 −
𝜕𝜕2𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄22
𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺2 
 
From the constraints: 
 
[13] 𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺1 = −𝑑𝑑∆ 
[14] 𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺2 = 𝑑𝑑∆ 
 
And from both of these conditions: 
 
[15] 𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺1 + 𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺2 = 0 
 
Substituting this into the equation after total differentiation yields: 
 
[16] � 𝜕𝜕
2𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄1𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺
− 𝜕𝜕
2𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄2𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺
� 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 =
𝜕𝜕2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕∆2
𝑑𝑑∆ + 𝜕𝜕
2𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄12
𝑑𝑑∆ + 𝜕𝜕
2𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄22
𝑑𝑑∆ 
 
After grouping like terms and rearranging them: 
 
[17] 𝑑𝑑∆
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺
=
𝜕𝜕2𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄1𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺
 − 𝜕𝜕
2𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄2𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺
𝜕𝜕2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕∆2
 + 𝜕𝜕
2𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄1
2  + 
𝜕𝜕2𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄2
2
 
 
This expression explains what happens to the amount of load management shifted when 
there is a change in the price of natural gas.  After signing each of the individual components, the 
expression is positive.  The numerator will be positive because during period 1 (the peak period) 
less efficient units are used as the marginal units.  This will cause costs in period 1 to go up more 
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than the costs in period 2 (the off-peak period).  In the off-peak period, the marginal unit is 
usually a combined cycle unit while in the peak period, it is a single peaking unit.  The peaking 
unit burns about 1.5 times the amount of fuel as the combined cycle unit. 
In the denominator, the second order terms with respect to Q will be positive if there the 
cost curves are convex.  There should be no change in marginal costs when moving from off-
peak to peak periods.  The second derivative with respect to Δ is also positive if a convex cost 
function is assumed.  When thinking about the magnitudes of the numerator versus the 
denominator, if the two terms in the numerator are similar (so that the numerator is small) or if 
the denominator is large, then utilities will have less of an incentive to do load management.  
With the expression in equation [17] expected to be positive, this means that the model predicts 
that an increase in the price of natural gas will lead to an increase in the amount of load 
management performed.  Conversely, a decrease in natural gas prices will lead to a decline in 
load management activity. 
 
2.5 Data 
Every year, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) collects data from electric 
utilities about various aspects of their electric power production.  Congress mandated the data 
collection “to promote sound policymaking, efficient markets, and public understanding”.20  The 
data are summarized and included in EIA publications such as Electric Power Monthly and 
Electric Power Annual.  The survey is used to collect data on roughly 3,300 respondents.  Of that 
number, approximately 3,200 are electric utilities while 100 are nontraditional entities such as 
energy service providers or the unregulated subsidiaries of electric utilities and power marketers. 
20 http://205.254.135.24/cneaf/electricity/page/data.html  
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This paper uses DSM program data from EIA 861 forms, which are the “Annual Electric 
Power Industry Data Files”.  These forms include information on annual generation, retail 
revenue, sales, number of customers, and demand side management program details at the utility 
level.  The forms also have data on time-invariant utility characteristics, such as location and 
ownership type.  The variables of interest that are related to company-administered load 
management programs include potential peak reductions, actual peak reductions, and program 
costs.  Potential peak reductions reflect “the installed load reduction capability, in megawatts 
(MW), of program participants during the time of system peak” (U.S. DOE, Benefits of Demand 
Response and Recommendations, p. 10).  Actual peak reduction reflects “the changes in the 
demand for electricity resulting from a load management program that is in effect at the same 
time that the utility experiences its annual peak load” (U.S. DOE, Benefits of Demand Response 
and Recommendations, p. 10).  The program costs consist of both direct and indirect utility 
expenses, including program administration, payments to participants, and marketing.  However, 
costs reported to the EIA do not include those incurred directly by participating customers.  The 
EIA forms also collect data on load management incentive payments, which are payments by the 
utility to the customer for load management activities.  Additionally, each utility is assigned a 
unique identification number, which is consistent from one year to the next and across various 
EIA forms. 
The EIA 861 forms were implemented in January 1985, and the EIA started collecting 
data as of year-end 1984.  The data are publically available on the EIA website from 1990 to 
2010.  The forms also report DSM activity broken down by sector.  There are four different 
sector classifications: residential, commercial, industrial, and other (includes transportation).  
Beginning in 2010, the DSM data were reported by utility and state, adding another layer of 
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detail into the data.  In 2010, there were 35 multi-state utilities, while in 2011 there were 39 
utilities of this type. 
The sample used for this analysis contains data from 2001 through 2011, and only 
includes utilities that fill out the EIA 861 Form 3, which contains information on the DSM 
measures.  Furthermore, only utilities with certain ownership types are kept, which are then 
classified into three groups – private, local government, and cooperative.  The private group 
consists of investor-owned utilities and retail power marketers; the local government group 
contains municipal, municipal marketing authority, and political subdivision utilities; and the 
cooperative group is made up of cooperative utilities.  The utilities that are classified with 
ownership types of federal, state, transmission, or other, are excluded from my sample. 
In addition to narrowing the sample based on ownership type, any utilities that have 
negative values for the DSM measures are dropped from the sample.  This eliminates two 
utilities from the sample.  Observations where the amount of actual load management peak 
reduction exceeds the maximum load for the year are also excluded from the sample since it is 
unrealistic for utilities to reduce their load in an amount greater than the maximum amount of 
electricity demanded during that year.  There are only three observations in the dataset where 
these peak reductions are greater than maximum load.  The final dataset includes 1,395 unique 
utilities and 9,574 observations in an unbalanced panel dataset.  The amount of time that each 
utility is in the dataset varies, with 25 percent of utilities being in the dataset for the entire time 
period. 
Table 2.1 shows the total amount of load management activity by year, separating out 
potential peak load reductions (in MW) and actual peak load reductions (in MW) from 2001 
through 2011.  It also shows each of these variables normalized by peak summer demand (in 
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MW).  These numbers are calculated using the EIA 861 forms described above.  This table 
shows that the total amount of potential peak reductions in the first column decreased from 2001 
through 2004 and then increased from 2005 through 2011.  The total amount of actual peak 
reductions displayed in the second column followed a similar pattern, decreasing from 2001 
through 2003 before mostly rising again from 2004 through 2011.  If the potential and actual 
reductions are normalized using peak summer demand (in MW), I get measures for program 
capacity and utilization, respectively.  These measures are shown in the third and fourth columns 
of Table 2.1.  Program capacity decreases steadily from 2001 through 2004.  After that, program 
capacity fluctuates up and down and there isn’t a clear trend during the remaining time period.  
The annual values for program utilization also show a steady decline from 2001 through 2004, 
then some fluctuations in 2005 and 2006 before stabilizing from 2007 through 2010.  Following 
this period of stability, program utilization declines slightly in 2011. 
Calculating program usage and capacity based on the percentage of summer peak is a 
good indication of how much load management a utility is using and the size of each utility’s 
program.  It also allows for the comparison of the usage and capacity of LM programs among 
utilities of different sizes.  For example, say Utility A has a peak summer demand of 10 MW and 
has actual annual peak LM reductions of 2 MW, then its program utilization is 0.2, or 20 percent.  
Utility B could have a peak summer demand of 100 MW and actual annual peak LM reductions 
of 20 MW.  Using those numbers, Utility B has the same program utilization as Utility A (20 
percent), even though the absolute amount of LM reductions done by Utility B is 10 times the 
amount done by Utility A.  For the purpose of this analysis, the amount of LM reductions has 
been normalized using the historic peak summer demand from the data for each utility. 
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As mentioned in the data description earlier in this section, these forms also include 
information on the direct and indirect costs of DSM programs.  As the amount of DSM activity 
has increased from 2001 to 2011, the total DSM costs during this same time period grew as well 
from roughly $1.2 billion in 2001 to $4.7 billion in 2011.21  Since the amount of potential peak 
reductions from 2001 and 2011 declined, the increases in total costs could have been due to 
program set-up becoming more expensive or changes to programs other than load management 
during that time period. 
Table 2.2 displays summary statistics for the entire sample, and Tables 2.3a and 2.3b split 
the sample based on treatment and comparison groups.  Table 2.3a contains the data for non-
private utilities and Table 2.3b displays the summary statistics for private utilities.  The treatment 
group consists of utilities that ever generate electricity, while the comparison group has utilities 
that do not generate electricity.  The methodology section below explains additional details about 
these two groups.  Tables 2.3a and 2.3b show that the treatment group is made up of utilities that 
are bigger in terms of peak summer demand and retail revenues.22  Although the group of 
utilities that generate electricity do a larger amount of load management (based on both the 
actual and potential reductions measures), they also have a larger peak summer demand.  As a 
result, the mean values of load management as a percentage of the utility’s peak summer demand 
are closer between the two groups.  The summary statistics tables also show that, on average, 
utilities do not do much load management, which is understandable since they would only 
employ these programs during the peak hours of the year when electricity demand is very high. 
 
21 Total costs are in 2013 real dollars. 
22 Retail revenues have been converted to real 2013 dollars. 
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2.6 Methodology 
To test the impact of lower gas prices on the usage and size of existing programs (in 
MW), a difference-in-differences estimation technique is used.  The decline in natural gas prices 
after 2008 divides the sample into two periods, and can be used as an exogenous event because 
the decrease was due to technological improvements in obtaining natural gas.  The amount of 
U.S. gas shale production increased significantly after 2008, leading to lower natural gas 
prices.23  For this analysis, the post-period is the time period after the decline in gas prices, 2009 
– 2011 and the pre-period is the time period prior to the gas price decline, 2001 – 2008.  Figure 
2.3 shows the trend in U.S. natural gas citygate prices from 2001 through 2013.  While the gas 
price is volatile throughout that time period, there is a sharp decline in prices after 2008.  In 
addition to a drop in natural gas prices after 2008, the volatility in the price also declined.  Prior 
to and including 2008, the average annual coefficient of variation was 0.14, while after 2008, it 
dropped to 0.08.  With gas prices becoming more stable following 2008, this could change 
utilities’ long-term expectations regarding price levels, the variability of gas prices due to 
technology, natural gas generation, and the usage of their load management programs. 
The change in natural gas prices was due to an increase in domestic natural gas supply, 
which was obtained via advancements in technology.  Figure 2.4 uses data from the EIA and 
shows the amount of monthly dry shale gas production by location for 2001 through 2013.  
There is a sharp increase in production after 2008, which coincides with the decrease in natural 
gas prices in Figure 2.3.  With new technology and as fracking became more prevalent, not only 
did the amount of natural gas supplied increase, but natural gas obtained through conventional 
production types, such as gas and oil wells declined.  As shown in Figure 2.5, the amount of 
23 For more information on the trends in natural gas productions and prices, see 
http://www.eia.gov/pressroom/presentations/newell_02082011.pdf  
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natural gas procured through shale gas increased substantially after 2008, while at the same time 
production through gas wells and oil wells significantly declined even though total production 
increased. 
For the purpose of the analysis, there are two different groups of utilities: the treatment 
group consists of utilities with any reported generation from 2001 through 2011 and the 
comparison group consists of utilities without any generation.  Utilities that have their own 
generating facilities have much more control over the generating source of the electricity that 
they sell.  Such utilities can more easily decide to run a plant to generate electricity rather than 
employ a load management program when gas prices are low and energy demand is high.  
Alternatively, utilities without generation capabilities are limited to buying power on the 
wholesale market and cannot substitute natural gas generation and load management programs as 
easily. 
Furthermore, the sample is divided based on whether the utilities are private or non-
private (not for profit) and separate regressions are run for these two categories of utilities.  The 
non-private utility group is made up of utilities with ownership type of cooperative or local 
government.  These utilities act with the goal of output maximization and they want to serve as 
many customers as possible with the lowest cost.  Private utilities are often subjected to different 
regulatory restrictions than non-private utilities.  They are regulated by state public utility 
commissions (PUCs) and their retail rates need to be approved by the PUCs.  For this reason, 
they may respond differently to a decrease in natural gas prices and their load management 
program usage and capacity may vary from the actions of non-private utilities.  Therefore, these 
two categories of utilities are separated for the purpose of this analysis. 
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The dependent variable of interest is a measure of load management activity done by 
each utility in the sample.  For the purpose of this analysis, there are two different dependent 
variables of interest.  The first is the actual load management peak reductions (in MW) divided 
by historic peak summer demand (in MW).  This is a measure of program utilization – how much 
of the load management program a utility uses as a percentage of its summer load.  Historic load 
is defined as the load in the first year of data in the sample that is available.  The second variable 
of interest is the potential load management peak reductions (in MW) divided by historic peak 
summer demand (in MW), which is a measure of the size of the utility’s program as a percentage 
of its summer load.  Going forward, these variables will be referred to as “program utilization” 
and “program capacity”, respectively.   
To estimate the difference-in-differences regression, panel data will be used.  The 
regression can be written as:  
[18] 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
The dependent variable, “LM”, is either program utilization or program capacity.  The “Gen 
Ever” variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the utility ever generates any electricity, and 
0 otherwise.  This is the definition that is used for the treatment group.  The “Postperiod” 
variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the year is greater than 2008, and equals 0 if the 
year is less than or equal to 2008.  The vector X represents control variables used in this 
regression, including each utility’s annual retail revenues, and a dummy variable for its state of 
operation. 
The change based on the treatment will be captured by the coefficient on the interaction 
term, β3, and the expected sign on β3 is negative.  For example, if utilities are truly treating 
natural gas and load management programs as substitutes, one would expect that a decline in 
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natural gas prices will decrease the usage of LM programs.  If utilities find it cheaper to run their 
natural gas plants than to employ their LM programs and give incentive payments to the 
customers of their load management programs, then they will decrease usage of these programs.  
The expected sign when examining the capacity of LM programs is more ambiguous.  A short-
term decline in natural gas prices may have no impact on the size of LM programs if the 
programs are already in place.  Additionally, utilities may be less likely to abandon programs 
that they have already invested a fixed amount of money in – they would only decrease the 
amount they use the programs.  However, program capacity could also decrease if utilities decide 
to shrink their programs once they are not utilizing them as much as before. 
 
2.7 Results 
2.7.1 Results for Non-Private Utilities 
Table 2.4a displays the results of estimating equation [18] when the regression is run for 
non-private utilities and the dependent variable is program usage.  The different columns in 
Table 2.4a represent the various specifications of the regression.  Column [1] presents the results 
for the regression when it is run without any controls.  Column [2] adds in a control variable for 
retail revenues, while Column [3] adds in the state dummies.  Standard errors are clustered by 
utility.  As expected, the coefficient on the interaction term between Gen Ever and Post is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level for all specifications in 
Table 2.4a.  This means that after the decline in gas prices, non-private utilities that generated 
their own electricity reduced their usage of load management programs.  This makes intuitive 
sense and is in line with the hypothesis that utilities are using gas generation and load 
management programs as substitutes when they generate their own electricity. 
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Looking more closely at Table 2.4a, the results indicate that following a gas price 
decrease, utilities with generation will decrease their usage of the load management programs by 
1.51 percent to 1.95 percent of their peak summer demand, depending on the specification.  With 
gas prices at a lower level, utilities may choose to employ natural gas generation to meet their 
peak demand, rather than using their LM programs.  The usage of LM programs can be viewed 
as a short-run decision for the utility.  The magnitudes of the coefficients on the interaction term 
between the utilities that generate and the post-period do not change very much across each of 
the specifications. 
Table 2.4b presents the results when using program capacity as the dependent variable.  
The columns are laid out in a similar fashion as Table 2.4a.  Column [1] contains the results for 
the simplest regression without any controls.  Column [2] adds in a control variable for retail 
revenues, and Column [3] adds in the state dummies.  Again, standard errors are clustered by 
utility.  Table 2.4b measures the change in the size or capacity of the program after a gas price 
decrease.  Here, all the results are negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  The 
results show that non-private utilities with generation decrease the size of their programs by 4.49 
percent to 5.18 percent of their peak summer demand.  Contrary to program utilization, which is 
a short-run decision for the utility, program capacity is a long-run decision for the utility.  A 
utility can decide on the size of its LM program and keep it constant for several years even 
though LM program usage can vary from year to year. 
Based on the results in Table 2.4b, there is a larger decline in the capacity of the LM 
programs compared to the change in the utilization of these programs following a decrease in gas 
prices.  This is consistent with a declining option value due to decreasing gas prices and lower 
volatility.  Having a LM program is valuable to a utility and it has the option to use the LM 
29 
 
program instead of running its gas generation plants to meet peak demand.  However, when gas 
prices are falling and the volatility has decreased, a utility is less likely to use its program and if 
it does use its program, the utility will use it less often.  Across the different specifications for the 
program capacity regressions, there is little variation in the magnitudes of the coefficients.  If 
utilities expected natural gas prices to remain lower and more stable following the decrease in 
gas prices, then they would not have increased the size of their programs after 2008.  The results 
in Table 2.4b appear to support this hypothesis.24 
The results presented in Tables 2.4a and 2.4b support the prediction of the model in the 
theory section of this paper.  When there is a decrease in the price of natural gas, utilities that 
generate electricity will decrease their load management program usage and program capacity 
relative to the utilities that do not have the capability to generate electricity.  This supports the 
notion that utilities are using these programs for cost minimization reasons. 
2.7.2 Results for Private Utilities 
 To determine whether private utilities are also motivated by cost minimization to use and 
maintain the size of their load management programs, the regression is run separately for private 
utilities.  The results are presented in Tables 2.5a and 2.5b, with the dependent variables as 
program usage and program capacity, respectively.  In both tables, the columns represent 
different specifications.  Column [1] presents the results for the regression when it is run without 
any controls and Column [2] adds in a control variable for retail revenues.  Column [3] includes 
a variable to indicate whether the utility is in a state with deregulated electricity markets.  In a 
24 The analysis was repeated using direct costs related to load management as the dependent variable.  The results 
using that variable are insignificant.  However, it is important to note that for utilities that operate both load 
management and energy efficiency programs, it is difficult to disentangle the costs and attribute some to load 
management costs and others to energy efficiency costs.  For this reason, the analysis is omitted from this paper, but 
the results available upon request.  The analysis was also done for utilities that only have load management 
programs, and the results are also available upon request. 
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deregulated electricity market, a monopoly system of electric utilities has been replaced with 
competing sellers. 25  Column [4] does not include the deregulation flag variable, but takes the 
specification in Column [2] and adds in the state dummies.  Standard errors are clustered by 
utility.  From Table 2.5a, the program usage results show that, unlike the results for non-private 
utilities, the coefficient on the interaction term for the private utilities regression is positive and 
not statistically significant.  The magnitude is approximately 2 percent of peak summer demand 
and does not vary much across the different specifications. 
 Similarly, the results for LM program capacity in Table 2.5b are also positive and not 
statistically significant.  The magnitudes of the coefficient on the interaction term ranges from 
1.26 percent to 1.77 percent of peak summer demand, depending on the specification.  Again, 
this result for the private utilities differs from the result for non-private utilities displayed in 
Table 2.4b.  The coefficient on the interaction term in the specification which includes the 
deregulation variable is slightly smaller in magnitude than the coefficients in the other 
specifications.  The coefficient on the deregulation variable in that specification is negative and 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  This means that private utilities that are in 
deregulated states are more likely to decrease their LM program size. 
 Based on the results in Tables 2.5a and 2.5b, it appears that private utilities have a 
different motivation when using and maintaining the size of their load management programs 
than non-private utilities.  After a decrease in gas prices, there is not a statistically significant 
response in private utilities’ LM program usage and capacity.  The results presented in Tables 
2.4a and 2.4b support the hypothesis of cost minimization for non-private utilities; however, the 
estimates for private utilities seen in Tables 2.5a and 2.5b indicate that while cost minimization 
25 For a map of U.S. states that have deregulated electricity markets, see 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html  
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may be occurring, any impact may be overwhelmed by other forces, such as regulatory pressure.  
Private utilities may choose not to cost-minimize due to regulations by public utility 
commissions.  Non-private utilities are not subject to the same constraints and when the gas price 
declines, they may be able to adjust their LM program usage and capacity to reflect cost 
minimization.  
 
2.8 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
As demand side management programs become more popular in the United States, it 
becomes more important to understand what they do and how they work.  This study fills a hole 
in the empirical literature by examining why utilities are motivated to use and maintain load 
management programs.  Previous literature in this area has focused primarily on the theoretical 
aspects of demand response, where these programs fit in to the current supply and demand model 
for the electricity market, and cost-benefit analyses of existing programs.  Further, there have 
been papers which have described in great detail some of the prior pilot programs and 
experiments involving demand response around the country.  My goal is to determine why some 
utilities embrace and develop demand side management programs, while others do not invest in 
these types of programs. 
This paper utilizes data from the past decade to analyze whether a decline in natural gas 
prices impacts utilities’ load management usage and capacity.  A gas price decline is used to 
examine whether utilities are motivated by cost minimization.  This study exploits a sharp 
exogenous decrease in natural gas prices and employs a difference-in-differences estimation 
technique.  I determine that for non-private utilities, gas prices have a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with both the usage of load management programs and the size of 
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existing programs if the utility generates its own electricity.  Utilities with generation will 
decrease their usage of load management programs by 1.51 percent to 1.95 percent of their peak 
summer demand compared to non-generating utilities.  The result for program capacity is larger 
in magnitude.  Utilities with generation decrease the size of their programs by 4.49 percent to 
5.18 percent of their peak summer demand relative to the comparison group.  The results for 
private utilities are not statistically significant. 
The results for non-private utilities provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis of 
substitutability between gas generation and load management programs, and that utilities may do 
so for cost minimization reasons.  A competing hypothesis is that utilities may choose to adopt 
these programs due to pressure from regulatory agencies.  While private utilities could be 
exhibiting some cost minimization behavior, it may be overwhelmed by regulatory pressure, 
which leads to an insignificant result.  The hypothesis regarding regulatory pressure could be an 
area for future research. 
Understanding why some utilities adopt, use, and maintain DSM programs is important 
not only to the utilities themselves, but also to policymakers and the public at large.  As more 
DSM programs are developed and used throughout the country, they will continue to play an 
important role in balancing electricity supply and demand.  Moreover, the development and 
growth of effective demand side management programs can lead policymakers and utilities to 
find an alternative solution to building expensive new generation plants to meet the growing 
energy needs of the United States. 
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3. Electricity Market Deregulation and Electric 
Utilities’ Energy Efficiency Activity 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the last twenty years, concerns about energy consumption, climate change, and 
higher electricity prices in the United States have led to energy conservation efforts.  The United 
States government has developed several policies to encourage energy conservation through 
energy efficiency programs.  Federal programs include the Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
Standards, the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP), and the Federal Hybrid Vehicle Tax 
Credit.  At the state and local level, there are utility-run electricity demand side management 
(DSM) programs.  
Energy efficiency programs are energy conservation programs which decrease the usage 
of electricity during all hours of the day.  They fall into a broad group of energy conservation 
programs which are termed demand side management (DSM) programs.  Several DSM programs 
in the United States were started in response to the energy crises in 1973 and 1979 and were 
pushed by regulators as money saving measures for rate payers.  While these programs have 
been in place for a few decades, there has been renewed interest in these types of programs 
following the California Electricity Crisis in the early 2000s, electricity market deregulation, and 
the increasing energy prices across the country during the last decade.  DSM programs have been 
used in the industrial sector, but the recent push has been for implementation at the residential 
customer level. 
Energy efficiency programs are becoming increasingly popular due to environmental 
concerns.  In 2012, the electricity sector was responsible for 32 percent of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions in the United States, making it the largest source of GHG emissions in the 
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U.S.26  It was also the single largest source of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the U.S., 
contributing 38 percent of the nation’s total CO2 emissions.27  Additionally, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) proposed the Clean Power Plan in June 2014 to cut carbon emissions 
from existing plants.  Each state is given a state-specific goal for carbon reduction by 2030, 
which is calculated as “CO2 emissions from fossil fuel-fired power plants in pounds (lbs) divided 
by state electricity generation from fossil-fuel fired power plants and certain low- or zero-
emitting power sources in megawatt hours (MWh)”.28  The EPA is letting each state decide how 
it wants to meet its carbon reduction targets.  Megawatt-hour savings from energy efficiency are 
explicitly listed as factoring into the denominator to calculate this rate.  Therefore, energy 
efficiency programs may play a significant role in helping to reduce the carbon emissions in the 
United States. 
This paper analyzes the impact of regulation on electric utilities’ energy efficiency 
programs.  It exploits a change in states’ regulatory status in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  This 
shift to deregulation occurred in some states, but not in others.  Additionally, deregulation 
impacted private utilities more than non-private utilities because private utilities are subject to 
stricter regulations from their state’s public utilities commissions (PUCs).  This paper employs a 
triple difference model in order to determine the impact of deregulation on energy efficiency 
activity. 
Following the deregulation of electricity markets, private utilities decreased their energy 
efficiency activity by approximately 200,000 MWh per utility.  This is a large amount of activity, 
which is roughly equivalent to a natural gas plant running at full capacity for an entire year.  The 
26 http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/electricity.html 
27 http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/co2.html  
28 For more information on the EPA Clean Power Plan, see http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/fact-
sheet-clean-power-plan-framework  
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results in this paper support the notion that utilities are under regulatory pressure to make energy 
efficiency investments and this may be the motivation behind their energy efficiency activity. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section provides additional 
background information about energy efficiency programs and the history of electricity market 
deregulation in the United States.  Then the previous literature on energy efficiency is 
summarized.  After that, the methodology and data used in this analysis are discussed.  The 
results follow in the subsequent section, and then the paper concludes and offers some policy 
implications. 
 
3.2 Background 
3.2.1 Energy Efficiency Programs 
Demand side management (DSM) programs encompass both load management (LM) and 
energy efficiency (EE) activity.  Generally, load management refers to activities to curb energy 
consumption during the peak hours of the day or during high price periods.  They are sometimes 
referred to as demand response (DR) programs.  Utilities will pay customers a dollar amount 
(usually per MW) for voluntarily decreasing their demand during peak hours of the day.  Energy 
efficiency (EE), on the other hand, refers to efforts to reduce the amount of energy required to do 
certain activities and typically involves energy conservation across all hours of the day not just 
during peak periods.  For example, replacing traditional light bulbs with fluorescent ones that 
give the same amount of illumination is an energy efficiency action.  For an action to qualify as 
an energy efficiency activity by a utility, the utility needs to invest in the capital cost of the 
project.  Regulators allow utilities to include energy efficiency activities in their rate base.  
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Therefore, utilities can charge electricity prices that would earn them a rate of return on their 
investments and in turn, rate payers are paying for the programs. 
Using data from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), which runs the 
electricity grid in New York State, Figure 3.1 shows how the hourly load curve changes with the 
implementation of a hypothetical energy efficiency program.  The solid blue line represents the 
actual load data for July 19, 2013 and the dashed orange line represents an EE program that 
reduces energy usage by 5 percent.  With an EE program in place, the hourly load curve has 
decreased during every hour of the day.  The focus of this paper is energy efficiency programs, 
and the motivation behind load management program usage is discussed in Chapter 1.  This 
paper also does not explore other types of energy efficiency policies that do not apply directly to 
utilities.  Examples of these policies include incentives to improve household appliances and 
credits for purchasing low-emissions vehicles. 
3.2.2 Electricity Market Deregulation 
 Traditionally, electricity was provided by utilities to customers in their service area.  
State governments established public utilities commissions (PUCs) to regulate and oversee the 
energy industry.  In addition to ensuring that electricity was provided reliably, the PUCs made 
sure that electric prices were fair.  The regulation of electricity markets led to monopolies in the 
industry, with utilities having control over all processes of electricity generation, transmission, 
and distribution.  In the mid-1990s, many states looked into expanding competition in their 
electricity markets, believing that consumers would receive better prices with the relaxation of 
the monopolies.  This led to electricity market deregulation in several states.  Prior federal rule 
changes had allowed competition in the wholesale market, but the state level restructuring 
deregulated the retail rates and let consumers have direct access to wholesale suppliers. 
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The structure of a traditional utility in a regulated market is characterized by the utility 
being primarily responsible for its own generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity to 
all the retail customers in its service territory.  After deregulation, most utilities unbundled their 
generation processes.  Utilities divested their assets, separating their generation facilities from 
transmission and distribution assets.  Vertically integrated utilities were replaced with new 
institutions managed by all market participants.  Deregulation also led to the creation of new 
entities, such as Independent System Operators (ISOs), who coordinate the purchase of power 
and transmission scheduling.  Additionally in deregulated markets, customers have choices and 
can purchase power from any of the suppliers on the grid.  Market prices replaced government 
regulation of the energy portion of utility rates, making prices more competitive.  Currently, even 
between states that have deregulated electricity markets, there are regional differences.  Each 
region varies in their rules concerning the power exchanges and other aspects of their market.29 
Table 3.1 summarizes the states that deregulated their electricity markets and the year of 
deregulation activity.  According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), as of 
September 2010, 15 states and the District of Columbia had deregulated electricity markets.  An 
additional 7 states had started but suspended their deregulation activity.  The earliest states to 
implement deregulation were Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island – they deregulated in 
1998.  Of the states that deregulated, Michigan, Oregon and Texas were the ones that deregulated 
latest, doing so in 2002.  The other states that experienced a restructuring of their electricity 
markets all did so in the short time period from 1998 through 2002.  Since states have 
deregulated their electricity markets, there has been mixed evidence as to whether or not 
electricity market deregulation leads to lower energy prices. 
29 For additional information on the structure of the electric industry before and after deregulation, see the 
Department of Energy’s “A Primer on Electric Utilities, Deregulation, and Restructuring of U.S. Electricity 
Markets” (2002) and Joskow and Schmalensee’s “Markets for Power” (1983). 
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3.3 Previous Literature 
The previous literature related to energy efficiency programs has mostly been cost-
benefit analyses and theoretical models.  There has been some literature devoted to analyzing the 
impact of electricity market deregulation on energy prices.  This paper fills a void in the 
empirical literature examining the motivation behind utilities’ usage of energy efficiency 
programs and the role that electricity market deregulation plays in energy efficiency activity. 
Arimura, et al (2011) examines the cost effectiveness of electricity energy efficiency 
programs.  The study allows energy efficiency DSM spending to have a potential long-term 
demand effect and it uses instrumental variables to address the possible endogeneity in spending.  
The results show that ratepayer-funded DSM expenditures between 1992 and 2006 produced a 
central estimate of 0.9 percent savings in electricity consumption.  The savings come at an 
expected average cost to the utilities of 5 cents per kWh saved, with a discount rate of 5 percent. 
Several authors analyze the energy efficiency gap, or the difference between actual and 
optimal energy use and whether such a gap exists.  Jaffe and Stavins (1994) identifies the major 
issues in defining optimal energy use and considers energy efficiency as a “means to the end of 
overall efficient (and equitable) resource allocation”.  The differing views from technologists and 
economists on optimal energy use are examined and various levels of economic potential and 
social optimum for energy efficiency are offered.  Alcott and Greenstone (2012) provides a more 
recent examination of the energy efficiency gap and whether it exists.  This paper differentiates 
between two types of market failures related to energy efficiency – energy use externalities and 
investment inefficiencies – and separately examines their policy implications.  The paper’s 
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findings suggest that there is a large amount of heterogeneity in investment inefficiencies and 
targeted policies would be more effective than general subsidies or mandates. 
Both Jaffe and Stavins (1994) and Alcott and Greenstone (2012) provide insights into the 
optimal level of energy use and how market failures arise.  However, the literature on energy 
efficiency is lacking empirical research related to the motivation of electric utilities’ use of these 
programs.  This paper examines electric utilities’ behavior related to energy efficiency and looks 
into whether deregulation impacts their energy efficiency activity. 
 
3.4 Data 
 The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) collects data from electric utilities 
and compiles the data in various forms.  The EIA 861 forms, or the “Annual Electric Power 
Industry Data Files”, include information on DSM programs and utility characteristics, and the 
data are collected annually.  There are approximately 3,300 respondents every year – roughly 
3,200 are electric utilities and 100 are nontraditional entities such as energy service providers or 
the unregulated subsidiaries of electric utilities and power marketers. 
 The EIA 861 forms contain data at the utility level and each utility is assigned a unique 
identification number which is consistent from one year to the next and across various EIA 
forms.  They include information that varies from year to year including peak summer demand, 
revenues, sales, and demand side management program details.  Additionally, the forms have 
time-invariant information on utility location and ownership type.  For this paper, the key 
variables of interest are related to energy efficiency programs.  The energy efficiency “energy 
effects” variable refers to changes in aggregate electricity use for customers that participate in a 
utility DSM program and is measured in megawatt hours (MWh).  These programs reduce 
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overall electricity consumption and savings are “generally achieved by substituting technically 
more advanced equipment to produce the same level of end-use services using less electricity”.30  
Some examples of energy efficiency activities include more efficient appliances, lighting, and 
heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) systems.  The data reported do not indicate the 
potential amount of energy savings based on these utility programs, but rather the total amount of 
energy saved in a given year. 
The EIA 861 forms were implemented in January 1985, and the EIA started collecting 
data as of year-end 1984.  The data are publically available on the EIA website from 1990 to 
2011.  The forms also report DSM activity broken down by sector.  There are four different 
sector classifications: residential, commercial, industrial, and other (includes transportation).  
Beginning in 2010, the DSM data were reported by utility and state, adding another layer of 
detail into the data.  In 2010, there were 35 multi-state utilities, while in 2011 there were 39 
utilities of this type. 
The sample used for this analysis contains data from 1990 through 2011.  Furthermore, 
only utilities with certain ownership types are kept.  These are classified into two main groups – 
private and non-private (or not for profit).  The private group consists of investor-owned utilities 
and retail power marketers, while the non-private group includes municipal, municipal marketing 
authority, political subdivision, and cooperative utilities.  The utilities that are classified with 
ownership types of federal, state, transmission, or other, are excluded from the sample. 
In addition to narrowing the sample based on ownership type, any utilities that have 
negative values for the energy efficiency measures are dropped from the sample.  This eliminates 
one utility from the sample.  The amount of time that each utility is in the dataset is varied, with 
30 For more information on the data included in the EIA 861 forms, see 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/index.html  
41 
 
                                                          
90 percent of utilities being in the dataset for the entire 22 year time period.  As these utilities 
make up the majority of my sample, and because I want to look at utility behavior both before 
and after the change in electricity markets, the final dataset only includes utilities that fill out the 
EIA 861 forms during all 22 years.  The final dataset used in this analysis includes 2,827 unique 
utilities and 62,194 observations in a panel dataset.   
Table 3.2 shows the total amount of energy efficiency activity by year from 1990 through 
2011.  These numbers are calculated using the EIA 861 forms described above.  This table shows 
that the total amount of energy efficiency activity steadily increased from 1990 to 1995 before 
stabilizing at around 50 TWh of savings during the mid-1990s and into the early 2000s.  Starting 
around 2004, the trend in energy efficiency started increasing again until 2009 when there was a 
brief decline.  Following that year, energy efficiency activity continued increasing until it was 
approximately 120 TWh in 2011, the last year in my dataset.  As a comparison, this is roughly 
the amount of electricity that is generated by 14 nuclear power plants running at full capacity for 
a year, and is a large amount of energy saved.  It is also approximately 3 percent of total U.S. 
electricity consumption. 
Table 3.3 displays summary statistics for the entire sample, and Table 3.4 splits the 
sample based on ownership type.  The left panel presents the data for non-private utilities and the 
right panel displays summary statistics for private utilities.  All data in this table are for the time 
period before deregulation occurred.  The data in this table indicate that, on average, private 
utilities are much larger than non-private utilities based on the observable variables of peak 
summer demand, retail revenues, and energy efficiency activity.  Tables 3.5a and 3.5b further 
split the data based on whether or not the utilities are located in a deregulated state.  Table 3.5a 
contains the data for non-private utilities and Table 3.5b displays the summary statistics for 
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private utilities.  The treatment group consists of utilities that are located in deregulated states, 
while the comparison group contains utilities that are located in states that still have regulated 
markets.  The methodology section below explains additional details about these two groups.  
Tables 3.5a and 3.5b show that within each ownership type, the utilities on average are similar in 
terms of the measures of peak summer demand and retail revenues.  For private utilities, utilities 
in states that deregulate their electricity markets have slightly larger peak summer demands and 
retail revenues, but a smaller amount of energy efficiency activity when compared to utilities in 
regulated states.  For non-private utilities, the reverse is true.  Utilities in regulated states have 
larger peak summer demands and retail revenues, but a lower amount of energy efficiency 
compared to non-private utilities in deregulated states. 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 represent the time trends for each group, split by whether or not the 
utilities are in a deregulated state.  Figure 3.2 displays what happens to non-private utilities over 
time and Figure 3.3 shows the trends for private utilities.  These graphs show that the utilities in 
deregulated and regulated states move in similar fashions until around 2000, when most of the 
state deregulation occurs.  Following that, the line for utilities in deregulated states (shown in 
blue) rises significantly when compared to the line representing utilities in regulated states (the 
red line).  This pattern holds for both the private and non-private utilities.   
The data on when states deregulated was collected from various sources online.  Each 
state that transitioned to a deregulated electricity market is listed in Table 3.1 with the date when 
their electricity market became competitive. 
 
43 
 
3.5 Methodology 
To test the impact of electricity market deregulation on electricity reductions (in MWh), a 
triple difference, or difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation technique is used.  The 
utilities are split into two groups: those that are located in states that deregulated their electricity 
markets and those that are located in states with electricity markets that remained regulated 
during the entire time period.31  The states that deregulated their electricity markets all did so 
between 1998 and 2002.  In order to cleanly divide the time period in the analysis into a pre-
period and a post-period, the data for the years 1998 through 2001 are cut from the sample.  
Therefore, the pre-period consists of the years from 1990 through 1997, and the post-period 
includes the years 2002 through 2011.  The final dataset includes 18 years of data.  Furthermore, 
utilities are divided based on ownership type.  They are classified as either private or non-private 
(not for profit) utilities.  Private utilities are often subjected to different regulatory restrictions 
than non-private utilities.  They are regulated by state public utility commissions (PUCs) and 
their retail rates need to be approved by the PUCs.  For this reason, they may respond differently 
to a change in state regulatory status their energy efficiency program usage may vary from the 
actions of non-private utilities. 
  To estimate the triple difference regression, panel data are used.   The regression can be 
written as:  
[19] 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 +
𝛽𝛽4𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
31 Utilities in states that suspended their deregulation activities are placed in the group of that remained regulated 
because for most of these states, while legislation was passed enacting deregulation, deregulation only went into 
effect in two states before being suspended.  Additionally, putting the “suspended” states into the deregulated states 
group does not change the results significantly. 
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The dependent variable of interest is a measure of energy efficiency activity in MWh by each 
utility in the sample.  In a second specification, the natural log of energy efficiency activity is 
used as the dependent variable.  The “Dereg” variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
utility is located in a state that has deregulated its electricity market as of September 2010, and 0 
otherwise.  The “Priv” variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the utility lists its ownership 
type as “Private” in the EIA Form 861, and 0 if the utility reports its ownership type as 
“Cooperative”, “Municipal”, or “Political Subdivision”.  The “Postperiod” variable is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the year is greater than or equal to 2002, and 0 otherwise.  The vector X 
represents control variables used in this regression, including each utility’s peak summer demand 
and retail revenues. 
The change based on being a private utility in a deregulated state following restructuring 
will be captured by the coefficient on the interaction term of the three variables, β1, and the 
expected sign on β1 is negative.  Following deregulation, it is expected that private utilities will 
reduce the amount of energy efficiency that they do.  This would be the case if under regulated 
markets, public utilities commissions required utilities to perform a certain amount of energy 
efficiency every year.  With less regulatory pressure, the utilities may find that it is not in their 
interest to keep using their energy efficiency programs.  If private utilities act as profit 
maximizers, they need to completely recoup the capital costs that they invested in energy 
efficiency technology with a high rate of return; otherwise it does not make sense from an 
economic standpoint for them to do energy efficiency.  On the other hand, if utilities act in an 
altruistic manner and believe that even following deregulation, their public utilities commissions 
will look more favorably on their distribution rate requests for having and using energy 
efficiency programs, they may keep using their programs.  Additionally, if they have already 
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invested in energy efficient technology, they could keep up the existing level of activity without 
investing in new technologies. 
 
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Triple Difference Results: Levels 
 The results of estimating equation [19] from the previous section are presented in Table 
3.6.  For this regression, the dependent variable is total MWh of energy efficiency reductions.  
The two columns represent different specifications of the regression.  Column [1] includes all the 
interaction terms and the variables for deregulation, private ownership, and post-period.  
Standard errors are clustered by utility.  The coefficient of interest on the Dereg*Priv*Postperiod 
variable is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  This suggests that 
following state deregulation, private utilities decrease their energy efficiency activity by 232 
GWh relative to non-private utilities.  This is consistent with the intuition in the previous 
paragraph.  Once regulatory pressure is lessened, electric utilities will decrease the amount of 
energy efficiency activity they perform. 
The magnitudes of the results in Table 3.6 are large.  They are as large as the average 
amount of energy efficiency performed by private utilities.  Private utilities also performed a 
larger amount of energy efficiency prior to deregulation.  For comparison, the decline in energy 
efficiency activity per utility is roughly the size of a natural gas power plant running at full 
capacity for a year. 
 Column [2] adds in a control variable for peak summer demand.  Again, standard errors 
are clustered by utility.  The coefficient on the variable of interest remains negative and is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  The magnitude has decreased and is -201,455 
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MWh in this specification.  This is the preferred specification for the levels regressions.  The 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that private utilities in deregulated states will decrease 
their energy efficiency activity following electricity market restructuring. 
3.6.2 Triple Difference Results: Natural Logs 
 Table 3.7 repeats the analysis but uses the natural log of energy efficiency annual total 
MWh as the dependent variable.  In order to keep observations with a value of 0 in the dataset, a 
value of 1 is added to all the energy efficiency MWh values before taking the natural logs.  This 
table has a similar layout to Table 3.6 with Column [1] including all the interaction terms and 
variables of interest and Column [2] adding in a control variable for the natural log of peak 
summer demand.  This table includes an additional column, Column [3], which includes a 
control variable for the natural log of retail revenues.  The coefficient of interest is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level with the magnitude ranging from -2.117 to -2.685.  
Again, this is a large number, and it implies that electricity market deregulation has important 
implications for energy efficiency activity.  The specification in Column [2] is the preferred 
specification. 
The specification in Column [3] includes the natural log of retail revenues as a control 
variable.  While including retail revenues as a control variable may help to control for the size of 
the utilities, revenues are directly related to the amount of energy efficiency activity that a utility 
performs.  With an energy efficiency program, the quantity of electricity supplied by a utility is 
reduced.  Regulators will adjust the rate of return utilities are allowed to gain.  However, there 
are no expectations that revenues will be higher or lower. 
   Looking at some of the other variables in Table 3.7, the coefficient on the “Private” 
variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications.  The 
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magnitude is large and roughly 3.5.  This indicates that all other things equal, private utilities do 
a larger amount of energy efficiency compared to non-private utilities.  This is consistent with 
the hypothesis about regulatory pressure.  Once private utilities face less regulatory pressure, 
they will decrease their electricity reductions.  The coefficient on the interaction term Priv*Dereg 
is also positive and statistically significant, but the magnitude is smaller than that of the 
coefficient on the “Private” variable.  Depending on the specification, the coefficient varies from 
1.576 to 1.946.  The coefficient on Priv*Dereg implies that private utilities in states that 
deregulate their electricity market had more energy efficiency activity than other states prior to 
deregulation. 
3.6.3 Robustness Checks 
Following the main analysis, there are some interesting checks that can be performed to 
test the sensitivity of the main results.  The first robustness check uses all 22 years of data from 
1990 through 2011 and defines different post-periods based on when each state deregulated its 
electricity markets.  For states that deregulated their electricity markets, the time period is 
divided into a pre-period before deregulation occurred and a post-period following deregulation.  
For states without electric restructuring activity, 2001 is used as the dividing year since this is 
roughly the midpoint of when deregulation occurred.32 
The definition of the “Postperiod” variable has changed to reflect the additional 
deregulation timing details using all 22 years of data.  To define the “Postperiod” variable in 
equation [19], for utilities that are located in states that deregulated, the variable is set to 1 if the 
year follows deregulation, and 0 otherwise.  For utilities that are located in states that did not 
have any deregulation activity during the years analyzed, the “Postperiod” variable is a dummy 
32 The analysis was repeated using 1998 (the earliest year of deregulation activity) and 2002 (the latest year of 
deregulation activity) as the dividing point and the results do not change.  Those results are available upon request. 
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variable that equals 1 if the year is greater than or equal to 2001 and 0 if the year is less than 
2001. 
The results when using all 22 years of data and specific state deregulation information for 
defining the “Postperiod” variable are presented in Table 3.8 and 3.9.  Table 3.8 displays the 
results when using the energy efficiency levels in MWh as the dependent variable, while Table 
3.9 contains the results when the natural log of energy efficiency is used as the dependent 
variable.  In both tables, Column [1] shows the coefficients from the preferred specification of 
the main results, which includes all the interaction terms and a control variable for peak summer 
demand.  Column [2] displays the results when all years of data and more specific state 
deregulation information are used in the regression.  The results in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 are very 
similar to the main results in both magnitude and statistical significance.  For private utilities, 
following state electricity market deregulation, there is a decrease in energy efficiency activity of 
approximately 200,000 MWh.  The coefficient on the variable of interest is -179,157 MWh and 
is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  In the specification with the natural log of 
energy efficiency as the dependent variable, the coefficient is equal to -2.565 and is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level.  Using all 22 years of data and more detailed information about 
when each state deregulated supports the hypothesis that private firms decrease the amount of 
energy efficiency performed after their electricity markets are deregulated. 
The second set of robustness checks that were performed are related to the states that 
started, but then suspended their electricity market deregulation activity.  There are seven states 
that suspended their market restructuring activities and they are listed in Table 3.10.  Two of 
these seven states – California and Arizona, started electricity deregulation and then suspended 
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their activities.  Column [3] of Table 3.10 lists the year when deregulation began, if applicable, 
and Column [4] shows the year when restructuring activity was suspended. 
In the main regression specifications, utilities that are in states that suspended their 
deregulation activities are not considered as deregulated utilities.  They are considered part of the 
comparison group with the utilities that are located in states with regulated electricity markets 
and their value for the “Dereg” variable is equal to 0.  As a robustness check, California and 
Arizona are included in the deregulated states category because their electricity markets began 
implementing deregulation before suspending restructuring activity.  Therefore, utilities that are 
in those states are given a value of 1 for their “Dereg” variable.  The results when California and 
Arizona are included as deregulated states are listed in Column [2] of Table 3.11 for the levels 
and Column [2] of Table 3.12 for the natural logs.  For comparison purposes, the results for the 
preferred specification are included in Column [1] of Tables 3.11 and 3.12.  After including the 
two states into the deregulated states category, the results are consistent with the main results.  
The coefficients are negative and statistically significant.  However, the magnitudes of the 
coefficients have decreased slightly. 
Another check using the states with suspended deregulation activity involves dropping all 
the suspended states from the dataset.  The results when those states are dropped from the dataset 
are presented in Column [3] of Tables 3.11 and 3.12, displaying levels and natural logs results, 
respectively.  For the levels, the coefficient on the interaction term of interest is negative, but it is 
no longer statistically significant.  However, the result for the natural logs is consistent with 
previous results.  It is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level with a magnitude 
of -2.327. 
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3.7 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 During the late 1990s, electricity market deregulation changed the structure of the 
electricity markets in the United States.  The driving force behind this change was to encourage 
competition among electricity providers and many advocates pushed for deregulation in hopes of 
lower energy prices.  This paper examines the impact of state electricity market deregulation on 
electric utilities’ energy efficiency program usage.  Using the change in deregulation and its 
differential impact on private and non-private utilities, I run a triple differences analysis and find 
that energy efficiency program activity declines for private utilities after a change in market 
structure.  Following electricity market deregulation, energy efficiency activity decreases by 
201,455 MWh to 232,435 MWh, depending on the regression specification, and the results are 
statistically significant.  This result is consistent with the hypothesis that utilities reduce their 
energy efficiency activity when they are not as heavily regulated.  Without pressure from their 
regulators, private utilities will no longer maintain the same level of energy efficiency. 
 Due to climate change concerns and the push for energy conservation during the last 
couple of decades, energy efficiency programs are becoming an important part of the United 
States’ overall energy plan.  If the goal of the government and state regulators is to encourage the 
usage of energy efficiency programs, the results in this paper indicate that they should pass 
regulations or legislation to urge utilities to do energy efficiency.  If there is another push for 
electricity deregulation among states, this could have an impact on their energy efficiency 
activity. 
Additionally, with the EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan, energy efficiency will become 
an increasingly important part of states’ energy portfolio in the coming years as states work to 
reduce their carbon emission levels.  As it becomes a priority for states to adopt and use energy 
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efficiency programs, states that deregulated their electricity markets, may need to create new 
incentives for using energy efficiency programs.  This could lead to the creation of tradable 
credits for energy efficiency and perhaps a new class of utilities to manage energy efficiency 
programs.  One avenue for future research is analyzing the potential impact of the Clean Power 
Plan on energy efficiency levels.  Another area of research is determining the cost of energy 
efficiency programs.  Based on the results in this paper, once deregulation occurs, utilities will 
decrease their energy efficiency activity when they can.  This implies that the programs are 
expensive to run.  In order to encourage utilities to adopt and run these programs, it is important 
to understand exactly how expensive they are and whether there is a change in firm profitability 
once the programs are adopted.  With the inclusion of more energy efficiency programs, there 
are additional areas for research to determine which programs are effective in reaching the end 
goal of energy conservation. 
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4. The Impact of Chinese Enterprise Restructuring 
on Employment, Wage Bills, and Productivity 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 In recent decades, China has put into place many economic reforms as it moves towards a 
market economy.  One important change is the transition of firm ownership structure from state-
owned to private.  Transitions of this nature began in the 1990s and continue today.  When 
implementing changes in firm ownership on a large scale, the government needs to consider the 
trade-off between firm efficiency and welfare of society as a whole.  Prior to reform of property 
rights, many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) suffered from inefficiencies, soft budget 
constraints, and low labor productivity.  The government began restructuring thousands of firms 
from state-owned to private in the mid-1990s in an effort to reform inefficient firms. 
From the welfare perspective, in addition to wages, SOEs can provide housing, health 
care benefits, and food subsidies for their workers (Cai, Park, and Zhao, 2008).  State-owned 
enterprises also play an important role in the economy as a social safety net.  As China lacked 
social insurance programs, such as unemployment insurance, state-owned firms often kept 
workers employed despite the redundancies in labor.  Following the introduction of social benefit 
programs, the government also instituted aggressive layoffs in order to eliminate excess labor at 
other state-owned firms. 
This paper analyzes the impact of the transfer of Chinese state-owned enterprises to 
private ownership on employment, wage bills, and labor productivity.  The time period examined 
follows the implementation of many of these reforms (1998 through 2006), and firms’ 
performance prior to privatization and after change in ownership structure are investigated.  
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Using a rich panel dataset, firms that transition are compared to those that remain state-owned 
within the same industry.  
Previous empirical work has shown that privatization improves firm efficiency and 
profitability (Megginson and Netter, 2001).  Improved firm performance is found for several 
different countries and time periods.  The economic models of privatization support the idea that 
the increase in productivity and decrease in costs lead to decreases in employment and wages 
(Brown, et al., 2009).  Using data on international airlines during 1973 through 1983, Ehrlich, et 
al. (1994) finds that completely changing from state to private ownership can increase the long-
run annual rate of productivity growth by 1.6 to 2 percent and decrease the rate of unit cost by 
1.7 to 1.9 percent.  La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) analyzes the performance of 218 
Mexican state-owned firms that privatized, comparing performance with industry-matched firms 
that existed before divestment.  The study shows that output of privatized firms increased by 
54.3 percent, sales per worker roughly doubled, and employment decreased by half.  However, 
for the workers that remained employed, wages increased. 
A major methodological hurdle when analyzing the impact of firm privatization is 
selection bias.  Firms that are chosen for privatization may already be more productive and 
profitable than those chosen to remain state-owned.  The concern is that positive performance 
ascribed to privatization could be due to the characteristics of the SOEs chosen for privatization 
rather than because of a change in property rights.  Previous empirical research has tackled this 
problem using various methodological approaches, including firm fixed effects, the Heckman 
two-stage estimation method, and difference-in-differences matching. 
Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2010) examine the impact of privatization on employment 
and wage effects in Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine following the dissolution of the 
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Soviet Union.  To address selection bias in the privatization process, they employ a variety of 
different strategies including OLS, firm fixed effects, difference-in-differences matching, and 
random trend models.  Using longitudinal methods and universal panel data on 30,000 initially 
state-owned manufacturing firms, Brown, et al. finds little evidence of job losses or wage cuts 
from either domestic or foreign privatization.  For domestic privatization, estimates are close to 
zero for employment and negative (but small in magnitude) for wages.  On the other hand, 
foreign privatization effects are almost always positive and sometimes large for both 
employment and wages.  The findings are inconsistent with the simple trade-off in privatization 
between efficiency and worker welfare that has been assumed by many observers. 
Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2007) investigate the relationship between different 
ownership types on firm performance in the Czech Republic following privatization.  A 
methodology using first differences combined with instrumental variables is used to address 
selection bias.  The analysis uses a panel dataset, which includes the majority of medium and 
large firms that privatized, looks at the time period from 1996 through 1999, and finds that 
overall, the performance of privately-owned firms does not differ from that of state-owned firms.  
However, the results imply that concentrated foreign owners show stronger growth in sales and 
profits and concentrated domestic owners decrease employment. 
In another study related to firm privatization in China, Bai, Lu, and Tao (2009) uses firm 
fixed effects and a Heckman two-stage estimation method to control for selection bias when 
examining the impact of privatization on social welfare and firm performance indicators.  The 
results indicate that privatization had little impact on changes in employment, but increased 
sales, labor productivity, and firm profitability. 
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This analysis seeks to improve upon the existing privatization literature and provide 
further evidence on the impact of firm restructuring in China.  To address the selection bias 
problem, a propensity score matching difference-in-differences estimation technique is 
employed.  The propensity score matching technique uses observable characteristics to pair a 
firm that remains state-owned with one that transitions to private.  Then, the difference-in-
differences estimation controls for unobservable time invariant differences between the two 
groups. 
The results indicate that firms that transition from state-owned to private decrease their 
employment on average by approximately 7 percent and reduce total real wages by 7 to 10 
percent on-average.  The estimates for labor productivity (measured as sales per worker) show 
increases of 11 to 26 percent on-average following a change in ownership structure.  The 
employment and wage effects fade over time, while the productivity effects persist for a longer 
period of time.  These estimates are consistent with previous theoretical work and empirical 
estimates.  Theoretical models predict that employment would fall as a result of firms becoming 
more efficient, while labor productivity would rise.  However, the effect on wages is 
theoretically ambiguous (Brown, Earle, Telegdy, 2010). 
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 4.2 provides background on the 
reforms related to Chinese SOEs during the past few decades.  Section 4.3 describes the theory 
related to privatization and looks at how changes in ownership would impact employment, 
wages, and labor productivity.  Section 4.4 discusses the methodology and potential selection 
bias involved in the privatization process.  Section 4.5 describes the data, Section 4.6 provides 
and discusses the results, and Section 4.7 concludes and discusses next steps. 
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4.2 Background 
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the development of 
heavy industry was emphasized.  All input and output prices were set by government planners 
and the profitability of state enterprises was guaranteed.  There were wage reforms in 1956 and 
SOEs were reformed in 1978 due to inefficiencies and low labor productivity (Cai, Park, and 
Zhao, 2008).  Additional modifications to SOEs were made in the 1980s, as planned prices were 
slowly phased out and replaced by market prices, and changes were made allowing the 
enterprises to retain a larger share of their profits 
After Deng Xiaoping’s tour of the South in 1992 and the economic boom that followed, 
labor demand – driven mostly by newly developed private firms – increased in many cities (Cai, 
Park, and Zhao, 2008).  However, by the early 1990s, SOEs continued to suffer great losses and 
in 1994, the government started privatizing small and medium SOEs while protecting larger 
enterprises – a policy they referred to as “seizing the large and letting go of the small” (Cao, 
Qian, and Weingast, 1999).  This policy led to the privatization of all but the largest 300 state-
owned firms (Megginson and Netter, 2001).  In 1997, the 15th Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party formally sanctioned ownership reforms of SOEs and legalized the 
development of private enterprises (Zhu, 2012).  Also in that year, the government started 
aggressive SOE restructuring and established social benefit programs to help with the layoffs.  
During this time, tens of millions of workers were laid off.  By the mid-2000s, labor became 
increasingly mobile and enterprises were allowed to give more weight to market conditions in 
making decisions about employment and wages (Cai, Park, and Zhao, 2008).  Even though the 
number of state-owned enterprises has significantly decreased, they continue to make up an 
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important portion of China’s economy.  In 2007, SOEs accounted for 35 percent of China’s 
GDP. 
Due to the gradual and continuing transition of SOEs to privately-owned firms, and the 
importance of SOEs in China’s economy, the time period from 1998 through 2006 is used in this 
analysis.  This is the time period following the implementation of government policies and 
reforms.  Additionally, this is the time period used in previous literature, such as Bai, Lu, and 
Tao (2009) and Hsieh and Song (2015).  Since this analysis uses the same time period, the 
estimates can be compared to those from previous studies. 
 
4.3 Theoretical Predictions 
State-owned enterprises are subject to different constraints than private firms.  In China, 
this is particularly evident when examining employment in SOEs.  Prior to the mid-1990s, open 
unemployment was non-existent in China (Cai, Park, and Zhao, 2008).  The government 
protected workers and placed new graduates in state-sector jobs even when they were not 
needed.  Firms were held to tight restrictions prohibiting them from firing more than 1 percent of 
their employees each year, they could not dismiss certain types of workers, and if they fired 
workers, they were expected to help them find new jobs.  Workers were employed, but they were 
placed in firms that suffered from excess labor and inefficiency. 
In contrast, private firms are motivated by profit maximization and firm efficiency and do 
not have the same restrictions with employment.  They have more freedom to dismiss 
unproductive workers and can set wages at a competitive market level.  As a result, one would 
expect that with a change in ownership status from state-owned to private, firms that transition 
would make cuts to their labor force and employment would decrease in those firms.  If there is 
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an excess of labor in those firms, the new management would lay off workers that are not 
necessary, thus decreasing their costs. 
The expected sign on total wages following privatization is more ambiguous.  If wages in 
the state-owned firms are too high because the firms are subsidizing their employees for housing 
and food, then wages would be expected to fall after the firms are privatized.  However, wages 
could increase following privatization if the firms want to attract new workers or incentivize and 
reward existing workers using higher wages.  By examining total wages, change in the wages for 
the firm as a whole can be examined, rather than wage per worker.  Additionally, the total labor 
cost to the firm of restructuring can be analyzed from a monetary perspective. 
Labor productivity (measured simply as the ratio between sales and employment) would 
be expected to rise after firms transition from state-owned to private.  If firms are getting rid of 
inefficient employees, one would anticipate the firms to become more productive once those 
employees are let go.  Using the methodology detailed below, these theoretical predictions will 
be tested to determine whether empirical analysis supports them. 
 
4.4 Methodology 
 This paper examines the impact of Chinese firm privatization on three labor market 
outcomes: firm employment, total wage bills, and labor productivity, for firms that continue 
operating in the economy.  The variable for labor productivity is calculated as the firm’s real 
sales divided by the firm’s total number of workers.  For each of these outcome variables, the 
change in the value for a firm that transitions from state-owned to private is compared to a firm 
that remains state-owned during the entire time period.  Additionally, these comparisons are 
done using firms that are in the same industry. 
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 One concern when examining the effects of privatization is that firms that are privatized 
are those that are the most productive and profitable.  They may be selected for privatization, 
while those that remain state-owned are more inefficient.  Without a proper social insurance 
safety net in place, the government may want to maintain ownership of firms with worse 
prospects to prevent layoffs and wage cuts.  Selection bias has been addressed in the literature 
using different methodologies.  For example, Bai, Lu, and Tao (2009) tackle the problem by 
using firm fixed effects and a Heckman two-stage estimation method. 
The main difference in this analysis compared to the existing literature is in the 
methodology.  A propensity score matching difference-in-differences estimation technique is 
employed to address the possibility of selection bias.  This technique first generates a propensity 
score for each firm using observable characteristics and matches a firm that remains state-owned 
with one that transitions from state-owned to private.  After that, the difference-in-differences 
estimation controls for time invariant differences between the two groups. 
Another issue with previous empirical privatization studies is the lack of time series data 
and small sample sizes.  For example, La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) only have post-
privatization information for a single year.  With the panel dataset that is used in my analysis, 
transitions that take place over a longer period of time can be examined, and the impacts of 
privatization can be followed for a few years after the transition has occurred.  This allows for 
determining whether the effects of firm restructuring are short-term or if they persist for a longer 
period of time.  Additionally, the dataset that is used an industrial census of firms in China, 
which gives me a large sample of firms to work with.  Details of this dataset are provided below 
in the data section. 
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In this analysis, two groups of firms are used: those that ever transition from SOEs to 
private firms and those that always remain state-owned.  For the purpose of this analysis, the 
treatment group consists of firms that transition and those that remain state-owned are the 
comparison group.  The firms are classified by registration type and whether or not a firm 
transitions based on whether or not their registration type changes.  For the purpose of this paper, 
based on the definitions in the dataset, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are defined as firms that 
are either: (i) Majority-owned by the central government or local government; (ii) Registered to 
the state but jointly operated with a non-state entity; or (iii) Wholly state-owned.  Private firms 
are defined as those registered to natural persons, solely, in partnership, as limited liability 
enterprises or shareholding firms. 
To generate propensity scores for the first stage of my analysis, the probability of a state-
owned firm being privatized is predicted using a Probit model.  The dependent variable is equal 
to 1 if the firm transitioned from state-owned to private and equal to 0 if it remained state-owned.  
The explanatory variables are chosen because they affect the decision to transition, and are also 
guided by the existing literature.  In the Probit model, only the years of data prior to the 
privatization are used for firms that transition and all years of data for firms that remain state-
owned are included. 
Once these predicted values have been generated, they are used to match firms that 
transitioned (the treatment firms) to firms that remained state-owned (the comparison firms) in 
the same two-digit industry and year block.  Each year block consists of four years; the year 
blocks are 1999-2002 and 2003-2006.  The firms in the comparison group are present in the 
dataset during all years from 1998 through 2006.  Matching is done with replacement, based on 
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nearest neighbor and a common support condition is implemented using the minima and maxima 
comparison. 
After each treatment firm is matched to a comparison firm, a difference-in-differences 
estimator is used to determine the impact of privatization on employment, total real wages, and 
productivity (measured as real sales divided by employment).  This controls for unobservable 
time invariant differences between the two groups.  The difference-in-differences matching 
(DDM) estimator is calculated as: 
[20]  1
𝑛𝑛
∑ [(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇) − (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)]𝑛𝑛∈𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇  
For this analysis, the variables represented by Y include employment, total real wages, and 
productivity (sales per worker).  The time period t is the year the firm transitions from state-
owned to private, and the year t-1 is one year prior to the firm transitioning.  The estimators 
using the difference between t+1 (one year after the transition) and t-1, and between t+2 (two 
years after the transition) and t-1 are also calculated to determine whether or not the impacts of 
restructuring persist over time. 
 
4.5 Data 
The data used in this paper come from the Annual Surveys of Industrial Production 
conducted by the Chinese government’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and consists of an 
unbalanced panel of firms from 1998 through 2006.  The dataset includes all state-owned 
enterprises and all non-state owned firms whose annual sales revenue exceed five million RMB 
from its main business.  It contains information on the firm and its operations including firm 
identification codes, ownership type, location information, data on employment and wages, sales, 
export value, value added and industry identifiers.  The dataset provides information in nominal 
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values and the data are adjusted to real values using the output deflators in Brandt, et al. 
(2009).33 
As mentioned earlier, this study is only interested in firms that transitioned from state-
owned to private enterprises (the treatment group) and those that remain state-owned (the 
comparison group).  Additionally, only manufacturing firms and firms that continue to exist in 
the economy are included in the analysis.  Following Jefferson, Rawski, and Zhang (2008), firms 
with fewer than eight employees are excluded because smaller firms may not have reliable 
accounting systems and may report unusually low or high values for certain variables.  Table 4.1 
contains summary statistics for the firms in the sample, separated by treatment and comparison 
groups.  It shows that firms in the comparison group on-average employ more workers, pay more 
total wages, and have lower productivity than firms in the treatment group. 
Additionally, the dataset that is used has matched firms on characteristics other than their 
identification code listed in the dataset.  Using a list of legal entity codes or firm identification 
codes provided by Dr. Loren Brandt, firms that may have changed their legal entity codes over 
time are able to be matched.  They are matched on other characteristics, such as firm location 
and industry.  This helps identify firms that were mergers or acquisitions and allows the dataset 
to include firms in the panel even after the change in their legal entity code. 
 
4.6 Does Firm Restructuring Matter? 
4.6.1 Probit Model Results 
 Using the methodology described above in Section 4.4, first the probability of 
privatization is determined using a Probit model.34  The variables included in the Probit model 
33 Information on the deflators can be found at: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/. 
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are similar to those used by Bai, et al (2009), with the addition of some variables.  The model 
includes lagged log sales, lagged log sales squared, lagged sales per worker, lagged sales per 
worker squared, lagged current liability-asset ratio, lagged current liability-asset ratio squared, 
lagged non-SOE region share, lagged non-SOE three-digit industry share, the change in the non-
SOE region share and the change in the non-SOE three-digit industry share.  Additionally, the 
model includes fixed effects for year, three-digit industry, and region.35  These variables are 
included to control for any shocks that occur that are specifically related to each year, industry, 
or region. 
Table 4.2 displays the results of the Probit model.  The results from the Probit model 
suggest that medium-sized firms are more likely to be privatized.  The coefficients on the lagged 
natural log of sales and the lagged natural log of sales squared show an inverted U-shape to 
privatization.  This is further supported by the variables for lagged sales per worker, lagged sales 
per worker squared, lagged current liability-asset ratio, and lagged current liability-asset ratio 
squared.  The coefficient on the variable lagged non-SOE share in a three-digit industry is 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that firms are more likely to privatize if a higher 
share of other firms in the same three-digit industry have already transitioned to private firms. 
4.6.2 Difference-in-Differences Results 
4.6.2.1 Baseline Results 
 Once the propensity scores are generated using the Probit model described above, then 
each treatment firm is matched to a comparison firm and the impact of privatization is estimated 
34 This model was also run using a logit model and yielded similar results in terms of sign and significance.  They 
are available upon request. 
35 The regions are based on the following groupings of provinces: (1) Coastal – Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, 
Hebei, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, Zhejiang; (2) Inland – Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Shanxi; 
(3) Northeast – Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning; (4) Southwest – Chongqing, Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Yunnan; (5) 
Northwest – Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Tibet, Xinjiang. 
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using a difference-in-differences matching (DDM) estimator.  The difference between the 
treatment and comparison groups is taken before and after privatization occurred using the 
process described earlier in the methodology section.  The results for employment, wage bills, 
and productivity (as measured by sales per worker) are presented in log form in Table 4.3.  For 
each variable, the results are displayed for the year of transition, one year after the transition, and 
two years after the transition.  The first column identifies the year of analysis, the second column 
displays the observed mean, the third column shows the bootstrapped standard errors using 500 
repetitions, the fourth column presents the Z-statistic, and the fifth column lists the number of 
matched pairs for that year.  The stars next to the means show the level of statistical significance.  
One star represents the 10 percent significance level, two stars corresponds to the 5 percent 
significance level, and three stars denotes the 1 percent significance level. 
For employment, the results are negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
in the year of transition and one year after the transition.  However, the effect is strongest in the 
year of transition where the DDM estimator is equal to -0.076.  Having taken into consideration 
the initial differences between the two groups of firms, firms that are privatized have 7.6 percent 
lower employment relative to those firms that remain state-owned.  This result makes intuitive 
sense if there was a redundancy in labor at state-owned firms prior to privatization.  Following 
the firm restructuring, owners would layoff unneeded employees to cut costs.  One year after the 
transition, employment is still lower by 6.7 percent and the result is statistically significant.  
However, two years after the transition, the sign on the coefficient is still negative and of a 
smaller magnitude than the previous years, but it is no longer statistically significant.  A few 
years after the transition, the firms may have already made adjustments to their labor force and 
are no longer cutting employment as much as they were immediately following the transition to 
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becoming privately owned.  These results are in line with what the theory predicts and match the 
findings of other empirical analyses. 
For total real wages, the results are always negative and statistically significant.  The 
differentials range from -6.3 percent to -10.4 percent.  Again, this makes intuitive sense because 
if employees were overpaid prior to restructuring, their wages would be cut following the 
transition to a private firm.  For wages, there is not a clear pattern in the changes over time.  The 
differential decreases from the year of transition to one year after the transition, but then it 
increases from one year after the transition to two years following the transition.  While the sign 
on wages is theoretically ambiguous, the results here support a story where workers were paid 
too much when the firms were state-owned and the firms cut wages after they become privately 
owned. 
Meanwhile, productivity, as measured by sales per worker, increased every year 
following privatization.  The results for productivity are significant in all years, and range from 
11 percent to 26 percent.  The differential increases from the year of transition to one year after 
the transition, and then it falls from one year after the transition to two years after privatization.  
Following the transition from being a state-owned firm to a private firm, it is expected that 
productivity will increase as firms are eliminating excess labor and pushing to make the firms 
more efficient, and the results support this hypothesis. 
Based on the results presented in Table 4.3, the effects of restructuring appear to be 
strongest in the year of transition and fade over time for employment.  The impact on total real 
wages is significant in all years, but the strength of the significance varies from year to year.  
However, the impact on productivity seems to remain for at least two years after the transition.  
The longer term impacts of privatization can be examined with additional years of data. 
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4.6.2.2 Results based on State Affiliations 
As a check on the baseline results and to further examine the impacts of privatization on 
employment, total wages, and productivity, the sample is split based on the state affiliations of 
firms prior to privatization, when they are all state-owned.  Using the same matched sample from 
the main analysis, the firms that transition are separated into two groups: (1) those that are 
affiliated with the Central or Provincial governments, and (2) those that are not affiliated with the 
Central or Provincial governments.  The firms are divided in this way to determine whether there 
is a difference in how they respond to restructuring based on their state affiliations prior to 
privatization.  The Chinese government is highly decentralized and restructuring was 
implemented differently for firms based on their level of affiliation.  This analysis seeks to 
determine whether there is a difference in the way enterprises affiliated with the Central or 
Provincial governments responded to restructuring.  After the firms are split into these two 
groups, the difference-in-differences analysis is rerun.  The results are presented in Tables 4.4a 
and 4.4b.  Table 4.4a presents the results for firms that are affiliated with the Central or 
Provincial governments, while Table 4.4b includes the results for firms that are not affiliated 
with the Central or Provincial governments. 
For firms affiliated with the Central or Provincial governments, the impact of 
privatization on employment is negative, but only statistically significant in the year of 
transition.  The results show that in the year of transition, firms that are privatized have 15 
percent lower employment relative to the firms that remain state-owned.  The results for total 
real wages are more ambiguous.  The impact on total real wages is negative in the year of 
transition and slightly positive one year after the transition, but neither of these results are 
statistically significant.  The impact on productivity is significant in both years, with firms that 
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transition having 34 percent and 46 percent higher productivity relative to the control firms in the 
year of transition and one year after the transition, respectively.  Again these results are in line 
with the theoretical predictions; firms that become privately owned will cut their labor forces and 
productivity will increase. 
Looking at the results for firms that were not affiliated with the Central or Provincial 
governments, the impacts of privatization are statistically significant for employment, total real 
wages, and productivity in both the year of the transition and one year after the transition.  The 
employment differentials range from -6.1 percent to -6.9 percent, the total real wage differentials 
are approximately -6.9 percent for both years, and the productivity differentials range from 9 
percent to 24 percent.  These values are all smaller in magnitude compared to the results for 
firms that are affiliated with the Central or Provincial governments, although the signs are all 
what one would expect based on theoretical predictions.  Overall, the results are consistent with 
those for the full sample, which were presented in the previous section. 
In another variation of splitting the sample based on affiliation prior to transitioning, the 
sample is split into two different groups: (1) those that are affiliated with the Central, Provincial, 
or City and Prefecture governments, and (2) those that are not affiliated with the Central, 
Provincial, or City and Prefecture governments.  The sample is split in this way to determine 
whether there is a difference based on a firm’s affiliation.  In this version of the analysis, firms 
affiliated with City or Prefecture governments are included with those affiliated with the Central 
or Provincial governments.  Again, after the sample is split, the difference-in-differences analysis 
is rerun.  The results for the firms that are affiliated with the Central, Provincial, or City and 
Prefecture governments are presented in Table 4.5a.  Table 4.5b presents the results for those 
firms that are not affiliated with the Central, Provincial, or City and Prefecture governments. 
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For firms that are affiliated with the Central, Provincial, or City and Prefecture 
governments prior to transitioning, the impacts on employment, total real wages, and 
productivity are all statistically significant.  The results for employment and total real wages are 
significant at the 1 percent level and are similar in the year of transition and one year after the 
transition.  The employment differential is -15 percent in both years, and the total real wage 
differential is -17 percent the year of transition and -16 percent one year after transitioning.  For 
productivity, the differentials are 13 percent and 31 percent, the year of transition and one year 
after transitioning, respectively. 
The results for firms that are not affiliated with the Central, Provincial, or City and 
Prefecture governments prior to transitioning are statistically significant at the 5 percent level for 
employment the year of transition, and significant at the 1 percent level for productivity in both 
years.  The impact of privatization on employment is negative in both years.  However, the result 
is only significant in the year of transition.  Firms that transition have 4.8 percent lower 
employment relative to the firms that remain state-owned in that year.  The impact on total real 
wages is negative in both years, but neither of these results are statistically significant.  The 
productivity differentials range from 9.9 to 24 percent, and are statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.  These results are all consistent with the hypothesis of firms eliminating excess 
labor and cutting wages to decrease costs and increase productivity following a change in 
ownership from state-owned to private. 
 
4.7 Conclusions and Next Steps 
In an attempt to improve inefficient state-owned enterprises, the Chinese government 
introduced reforms that privatized state-owned enterprises.  It is important to understand the 
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impact of privatization on the social welfare and labor market outcomes in China.  Using a 
propensity score matching differences-in-differences estimation technique, the impact of 
enterprise restructuring on labor market outcomes in China is determined by looking at firms that 
transition during the time period from 1998 through 2006.  Enterprise restructuring is defined as 
firms that transition from state-owned to privately-owned, and changes in employment, total real 
wages, and productivity as measured by sales per worker are examined.  After using a Probit 
model to match the firms, the differences between firms that transition and those that remain 
state-owned are investigated for the year of transition, one year after transitioning and two years 
after the transition. 
The results suggest that prior to restructuring, firms were indeed inefficient and 
overstaffed.  Following privatization, firms that transitioned decreased their employment on-
average by approximately 7 percent and reduced total real wages by 7 percent to 10 percent on-
average.  At the same time, productivity rose on-average 11 percent to 26 percent following 
enterprise restructuring.  The effects for employment and wages fade over time, while the 
productivity effects last longer.  The results generally hold if the firms are split into different 
groups based on their state affiliations prior to privatization.  The employment and wage effects 
are negative, while the productivity effects are positive.  These effects are consistent with the 
story of firm restructuring following a change from being a state-owned enterprise to becoming a 
private firm, with firms shedding excess employment, cutting wages, and increasing 
productivity.  The results are also in line with the theoretical predictions and other empirical 
analyses in the privatization literature.  After implementing these changes to make the firms 
more efficient and increase sales, firms may decide to hire additional workers or increase the 
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wages of existing workers to reward them for their efforts.  However, an analysis of this sort 
would most likely require additional years of data. 
 The analysis in this paper leads to many interesting follow-up questions and avenues of 
further research.  Other variables, such as profits and access to credit, could be examined to 
determine if they were also affected by firm privatization.  The restructuring of state-owned 
firms also leads to changes in homeownership, child care, and other services previously provided 
by SOEs.  The privatization of state-owned firms could lead to decreases in other benefits 
previously provided by SOEs that cannot be measured by only looking at the change in wages 
over time.  Additional research could look at whether these services are provided by the 
government or if workers need to rely on private provision following firm privatization.  Another 
question that arises from this research is whether or not restructuring induces entry or exit in 
certain regions or industries.  The focus of this paper is on firms that continue to exist in the 
Chinese economy.  While it is difficult to measure entry and exit in the current dataset, this is an 
important question to answer since growth or decline of firms in certain regions or industries 
could have many public welfare implications. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Load Management Example 
 
    Source: NYISO load data from July 19, 2013. 
    Notes: LM line represents a hypothetical 1,000 MW LM program during peak hours. 
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Figure 2.2: NGCT Monthly Capacity Factor, January 2012 – December 2013 
 
     Source: Data are from EIA. 
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Figure 2.3: U.S. Natural Gas Citygate Prices, 2001 – 2013 
 
   Source: Data are from EIA. 
   Notes: Prices are in real 2013 dollars. 
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Figure 2.4: Monthly Dry Shale Gas Production by Location, 2001 – 2013 
 
    Source: Data are from EIA. 
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Figure 2.5: Natural Gas Withdrawals by Source, 2001 – 2013 
 
      Source: Data are from EIA. 
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Figure 3.1: Energy Efficiency Example 
 
 
Source and Notes: Load data are from the New York Independent System Operator. 
The dashed orange line represents a hypothetical energy efficiency program that reduces energy usage by 5 percent 
of actual demand. 
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Figure 3.2: Energy Efficiency Activity over Time, Non-Private Utilities 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Energy Efficiency Activity over Time, Private Utilities 
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Table 2.1: Annual Load Management Program Totals 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics, Full Sample 
 
 
 
Year
LM Potential Peak 
Reductions (MW)
LM Actual Peak 
Reductions (MW)
Potential Peak Reductions / 
Peak Summer Demand
Actual Peak Reductions / 
Peak Summer Demand
2001 27,272 11,548 0.0546 0.0231
2002 26,460 9,193 0.0472 0.0164
2003 24,899 9,015 0.0432 0.0156
2004 20,636 9,035 0.0349 0.0153
2005 20,963 10,188 0.0406 0.0198
2006 21,021 11,062 0.0243 0.0128
2007 22,937 12,421 0.0361 0.0195
2008 24,518 11,840 0.0392 0.0190
2009 25,558 11,791 0.0431 0.0199
2010 25,302 12,438 0.0392 0.0192
2011 25,734 11,874 0.0373 0.0172
Source:  EIA 861 Form 3
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Peak Summer Demand (MW) 708 2,346 0 26,750
Retail Revenues ($000s) 217,185 798,839 0 11,235,765
Cooperative 0.37 0 0 1
Local Government 0.49 0 0 1
Private 0.14 0 0 1
LM Actual / Peak Summer Demand 0.02 0.09 0 3
LM Potential / Peak Summer Demand 0.04 0.13 0 3
LM Actual Reductions (MW) 13 79 0 1,726
LM Potential Reductions (MW) 28 159 0 5,370
Source:  EIA 861 Forms 1 and 3
Notes:  Retail Revenues are in real 2013 dollars.
Some variables are not reported for certain utilities.
The combined sample has 9,574 observations.
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Table 2.3a: Summary Statistics by Group in Pre-Period, 
Non-Private Utilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3b: Summary Statistics by Group in Pre-Period, 
Private Utilities 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Name
Gen Ever = 0
Comparison Group
Gen Ever = 1
Treatment Group
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Peak Summer Demand (MW) 80 272 335 757
Retail Revenues ($000s) 21,376 38,799 66,919 194,602
LM Actual / Peak Summer Demand 0.022 0.08 0.014 0.05
LM Potential / Peak Summer Demand 0.034 0.12 0.024 0.07
LM Actual Reductions (MW) 2 9 8 45
LM Potential Reductions (MW) 4 17 16 71
Source:  EIA 861 Forms 1 and 3
Notes:  Retail Revenues are in real 2013 dollars.
Some variables are not reported for certain utilities.
There are 4,572 observations in the comparison group and 1,968 in the treatment group.
Variable Name
Gen Ever = 0
Comparison Group
Gen Ever = 1
Treatment Group
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Peak Summer Demand (MW) 3,035 5,238 4,410 4,986
Retail Revenues ($000s) 940,529 1,428,997 1,308,719 1,711,640
LM Actual / Peak Summer Demand 0.004 0.01 0.014 0.04
LM Potential / Peak Summer Demand 0.010 0.02 0.033 0.07
LM Actual Reductions (MW) 23 84 70 206
LM Potential Reductions (MW) 87 266 161 446
Source:  EIA 861 Forms 1 and 3
Notes:  Retail Revenues are in real 2013 dollars.
Some variables are not reported for certain utilities.
There are 203 observations in the comparison group and 745 in the treatment group.
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Table 2.4a: LM Program Usage Regression Results, Non-Private Utilities 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES LM Act Ann / 
Hist Pk Sum Load 
LM Act Ann / 
Hist Pk Sum Load 
LM Act Ann / 
Hist Pk Sum Load 
    
Gen Ever*Post -0.0169*** -0.0195*** -0.0151*** 
 (0.00498) (0.00516) (0.00511) 
Gen Ever -0.00731* -0.00899** -0.00465 
 (0.00383) (0.00372) (0.00381) 
Postperiod 0.0264*** 0.0258*** 0.0229*** 
 (0.00427) (0.00431) (0.00436) 
Real Retail Revenue  1.25e-08* 9.32e-09 
  (7.21e-09) (6.84e-09) 
Constant 0.0216*** 0.0206*** 0.0158 
 (0.00266) (0.00262) (0.0147) 
 
State Dummies 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Observations 8,089 7,786 7,786 
R-squared 0.016 0.017 0.103 
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: LHS variable is LM Actual Annual Effects normalized by Historical Peak Summer Load. 
Historical peak load is the peak summer load for 2001 or first year of data available for each 
utility. 
Data are for the time period 2001 – 2011. 
Utilities with observations only in 2006 are dropped from the sample. 
Non-private utilities include cooperative and local government utilities. 
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Table 2.4b: LM Program Capacity Regression Results, Non-Private Utilities 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES LM Pot Ann / 
Hist Pk Sum Load 
LM Pot Ann / 
Hist Pk Sum Load 
LM Pot Ann / 
Hist Pk Sum Load 
    
Gen Ever*Post -0.0481*** -0.0518*** -0.0449*** 
 (0.00905) (0.00930) (0.00922) 
Gen Ever -0.00933* -0.0142*** -0.00742 
 (0.00539) (0.00517) (0.00550) 
Postperiod 0.0601*** 0.0596*** 0.0543*** 
 (0.00848) (0.00859) (0.00846) 
Real Retail Revenue  2.69e-08** 2.50e-08** 
  (1.26e-08) (1.16e-08) 
Constant 0.0336*** 0.0324*** 0.0231 
 (0.00375) (0.00372) (0.0240) 
 
State Dummies 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Observations 8,089 7,786 7,786 
R-squared 0.026 0.029 0.102 
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: LHS variable is LM Potential Annual Effects normalized by Historical Peak Summer 
Load. 
Historical peak load is the peak summer load for 2001 or first year of data available for each 
utility. 
Data are for the time period 2001 – 2011.  
Utilities with observations only in 2006 are dropped from the sample. 
Non-private utilities include cooperative and local government utilities. 
 
 
  
82 
 
Table 2.5a: LM Program Usage Regression Results, Private Utilities 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES LM Act Ann / 
Hist Pk Sum Load 
LM Act Ann / 
Hist Pk Sum Load 
LM Act Ann / 
Hist Pk Sum Load 
LM Act Ann / 
Hist Pk Sum Load 
     
Gen Ever*Post 0.0192 0.0197 0.0191 0.0165 
 (0.0137) (0.0145) (0.0149) (0.0142) 
Gen Ever 0.0107*** 0.0106*** 0.00627* 0.00418 
 (0.00326) (0.00341) (0.00364) (0.00582) 
Postperiod -0.000447 -0.000678 1.66e-05 0.000796 
 (0.00189) (0.00198) (0.00226) (0.00279) 
Real Retail Revenue  1.67e-09 1.94e-09 2.02e-09 
  (1.65e-09) (1.66e-09) (1.84e-09) 
Deregulation Flag   -0.0107  
   (0.00972)  
Constant 0.00372*** 0.00222 0.0113 -0.0246** 
 (0.00127) (0.00201) (0.00890) (0.0106) 
 
State Dummies 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Observations 1,213 1,165 1,165 1,165 
R-squared 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.118 
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: LHS variable is LM Actual Annual Effects normalized by Historical Peak Summer Load. 
Historical peak load is the peak summer load for 2001 or first year of data available for each utility. 
Data are for the time period 2001 – 2011.  
Utilities with observations only in 2006 are dropped from the sample. 
Private utilities include investor-owned utilities and retail power marketers. 
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Table 2.5b: LM Program Capacity Regression Results, Private Utilities 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES LM Pot Ann / 
Hist Pk Sum Load 
LM Pot Ann / 
Hist Pk Sum Load 
LM Pot Ann / 
Hist Pk Sum Load 
LM Pot Ann / 
Hist Pk Sum Load 
     
Gen Ever*Post 0.0177 0.0177 0.0163 0.0126 
 (0.0139) (0.0147) (0.0152) (0.0142) 
Gen Ever 0.0231*** 0.0226*** 0.0132* 0.0130* 
 (0.00685) (0.00681) (0.00692) (0.00749) 
Postperiod 0.00103 0.000545 0.00205 0.00310 
 (0.00222) (0.00210) (0.00297) (0.00354) 
Real Retail Revenue  3.90e-09 4.49e-09** 3.17e-09* 
  (2.37e-09) (2.20e-09) (1.85e-09) 
Deregulation Flag   -0.0232*  
   (0.0123)  
Constant 0.0102** 0.00675* 0.0265** -0.0336*** 
 (0.00391) (0.00363) (0.0122) (0.0117) 
 
State Dummies 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Observations 1,213 1,165 1,165 1,165 
R-squared 0.012 0.016 0.025 0.236 
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: LHS variable is LM Potential Annual Effects normalized by Historical Peak Summer Load. 
Historical peak load is the peak summer load for 2001 or first year of data available for each utility. 
Data are for the time period 2001 – 2011.  
Utilities with observations only in 2006 are dropped from the sample. 
Private utilities include investor-owned utilities and retail power marketers. 
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Table 3.1: States with Deregulated Electricity Markets 
 
 
  
State State Abbreviation Year of Deregulation
Massachusetts MA 1998
New York NY 1998
Rhode Island RI 1998
Connecticut CT 2000
Illinois IL 2000
Maine ME 2000
New Jersey NJ 2000
Pennsylvania PA 2000
Delaware DE 2001
District of Columbia DC 2001
Maryland MD 2001
New Hampshire NH 2001
Ohio OH 2001
Michigan MI 2002
Oregon OR 2002
Texas TX 2002
Sources:
Energy Information Administration
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Table 3.2: Annual Energy Efficiency Totals 
 
Source: EIA 861 Form 3 
 
  
Year
Energy Efficiency 
Annual Totals (MWh)
1990 17,060,936
1991 23,432,348
1992 25,565,174
1993 40,203,068
1994 49,720,120
1995 55,332,076
1996 59,857,108
1997 55,467,136
1998 48,775,616
1999 49,691,724
2000 52,826,648
2001 52,946,056
2002 53,228,424
2003 48,253,568
2004 52,662,988
2005 59,000,096
2006 63,075,684
2007 67,277,888
2008 86,010,464
2009 76,911,768
2010 87,094,816
2011 120,658,706
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics, Full Sample 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics by Ownership Type in Pre-Period 
 
 
  
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Energy Efficiency Annual Total (MWh) 16,930 246,748 0 14,917,724
Peak Summer Demand (MW) 247 1,287 0 29,628
Retail Revenues ($000s) 61,200 373,425 0 11,235,765
Cooperative 0.29 0.46 0 1
Local Government 0.64 0 0 1
Private 0.06 0 0 1
Source:  EIA 861 Forms 1 and 3
Notes:  Retail Revenues are in real 2013 dollars.
Some variables are not reported for certain utilities.
The combined sample has 62,194 observations.
Variable Name Non-Private Private
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Energy Efficiency Annual Total (MWh) 910 15,962 195,082 625,025
Peak Summer Demand (MW) 64 245 2,625 3,914
Retail Revenues ($000s) 9,780 37,969 590,359 947,113
Source:  EIA 861 Forms 1 and 3
Notes:  Retail Revenues are in real 2013 dollars.
Some variables are not reported for certain utilities.
There are 28,754 observations for non-private utilities and 1,855 for private utilities.
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Table 3.5a: Summary Statistics, Non-Private Utilities in Pre-Period 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5b: Summary Statistics, Private Utilities in Pre-Period 
 
  
Variable Name
No Deregulation
(Comparison Group)
Deregulation
(Treatment Group)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Energy Efficiency Annual Total (MWh) 750 13,500 1,529 23,123
Peak Summer Demand (MW) 65 256 57 200
Retail Revenues ($000s) 9,880 39,330 9,395 32,167
Source:  EIA 861 Forms 1 and 3
Notes:  Retail Revenues are in real 2013 dollars.
Some variables are not reported for certain utilities.
There are 22,842 observations in the comparison group and 5,912 in the treatment group.
Variable Name
No Deregulation
(Comparison Group)
Deregulation
(Treatment Group)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Energy Efficiency Annual Total (MWh) 211,694 730,701 168,837 404,474
Peak Summer Demand (MW) 2,391 3,871 2,995 3,955
Retail Revenues ($000s) 505,834 931,677 724,388 956,536
Source:  EIA 861 Forms 1 and 3
Notes:  Retail Revenues are in real 2013 dollars.
Some variables are not reported for certain utilities.
There are 1,136 observations in the comparison group and 719 in the treatment group.
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Table 3.6: Triple Difference Results – Levels 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Energy Efficiency 
Annual Total 
Energy Efficiency 
Annual Total 
   
Priv*Dereg*Postperiod -232,435** -201,455* 
 (115,420) (106,320) 
Priv*Dereg -41,130 -104,018 
 (66,483) (68,282) 
Priv*Postperiod 252,369** 184,424** 
 (109,468) (84,331) 
Dereg*Postperiod 559.3 932.1 
 (861.0) (964.9) 
Private 191,703*** -56,682 
 (57,697) (65,267) 
Dereg 547.2 1,536 
 (744.7) (1,052) 
Postperiod 992.2*** -2,667** 
 (352.9) (1,338) 
Peak Demand Summer  111.6*** 
  (37.93) 
Constant 642.7*** -6,145*** 
 (201.5) (2,342) 
   
Observations 50,904 50,352 
R-squared 0.072 0.299 
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: 
LHS variable is Energy Efficiency Total Annual Effects in MWh. 
Data are for the time period 1990 – 2011, excluding 1998 – 2001. 
Only utilities in all 18 years of the dataset are included in the sample.  
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Table 3.7: Triple Difference Results – Natural Logs 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ln Energy 
Efficiency 
ln Energy 
Efficiency 
ln Energy 
Efficiency 
    
Priv*Dereg*Postperiod -2.117*** -2.369*** -2.685*** 
 (0.627) (0.651) (0.697) 
Priv*Dereg 1.877** 1.576** 1.946*** 
 (0.788) (0.667) (0.682) 
Priv*Postperiod 0.156 0.519 0.398 
 (0.345) (0.357) (0.368) 
Dereg*Postperiod -0.0981** -0.0965* -0.0844* 
 (0.0499) (0.0512) (0.0502) 
Private 4.660*** 3.392*** 3.590*** 
 (0.513) (0.430) (0.449) 
Dereg 0.0346 -0.00763 -0.0272 
 (0.0695) (0.0652) (0.0652) 
Postperiod 0.0984*** -0.0895*** -0.165*** 
 (0.0243) (0.0255) (0.0277) 
ln Peak Demand Summer  0.444*** 0.273*** 
  (0.0279) (0.0375) 
ln Retail Revenues   0.178*** 
   (0.0277) 
Constant 0.334*** -0.821*** -1.753*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0624) (0.165) 
    
Observations 50,904 50,352 49,081 
R-squared 0.230 0.326 0.353 
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: 
LHS variable is ln (Energy Efficiency Total Annual Effects + 1). 
Data are for the time period 1990 – 2011, excluding 1998 – 2001. 
Only utilities in all 18 years of the dataset are included in the sample. 
Control variables are ln (Peak Demand Summer + 1) and ln (Real Retail Revenues + 1).  
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Table 3.8: Triple Difference Results – Levels, Baseline vs. All Years 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Baseline All Years 
   
Priv*Dereg*Postperiod -201,455* -179,157* 
 (106,320) (93,459) 
Priv*Dereg -104,018 -110,557 
 (68,282) (72,504) 
Priv*Postperiod 184,424** 168,927** 
 (84,331) (78,171) 
Dereg*Postperiod 932.1 943.9 
 (964.9) (747.3) 
Private -56,682 -43,132 
 (65,267) (58,812) 
Dereg 1,536 1,667 
 (1,052) (1,177) 
Postperiod -2,667** -2,142** 
 (1,338) (1,068) 
Peak Demand Summer 111.6*** 109.3*** 
 (37.93) (35.72) 
Constant -6,145*** -6,384*** 
 (2,342) (2,375) 
   
Observations 50,352 61,465 
R-squared 0.299 0.308 
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: 
LHS variable is Energy Efficiency Total Annual Effects in MWh. 
Column [1] presents baseline result equivalent to Column [2] in Table 6. 
Column [2] displays results when all 22 years of data from 1990 – 2011 are used in regression. 
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Table 3.9: Triple Difference Results – Natural Logs, Baseline vs. All Years 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Baseline All Years 
   
Priv*Dereg*Postperiod -2.369*** -2.565*** 
 (0.651) (0.606) 
Priv*Dereg 1.576** 1.528** 
 (0.667) (0.689) 
Priv*Postperiod 0.519 0.401 
 (0.357) (0.335) 
Dereg*Postperiod -0.0965* -0.0336 
 (0.0512) (0.0461) 
Private 3.392*** 3.749*** 
 (0.430) (0.440) 
Dereg -0.00763 -0.0433 
 (0.0652) (0.0694) 
Postperiod -0.0895*** -0.0306 
 (0.0255) (0.0225) 
ln Peak Demand Summer 0.444*** 0.391*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0260) 
Constant -0.821*** -0.682*** 
 (0.0624) (0.0570) 
   
Observations 50,352 59,336 
R-squared 0.326 0.324 
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: 
LHS variable is ln (Energy Efficiency Total Annual Effects + 1). 
Column [1] presents baseline result equivalent to Column [2] in Table 7. 
Column [2] displays results when all 22 years of data from 1990 – 2011 are used in 
regression. 
The control variable is ln (Peak Demand Summer + 1). 
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Table 3.10: States with Suspended Electricity Market Deregulation 
 
 
  
State State Abbreviation Year of Deregulation Year of Suspension
California CA 1998 2002
Arizona AZ 2001 2005
Nevada NV N/A 2002
Montana MT N/A 2003
New Mexico NM N/A 2003
Arkansas AR N/A 2003
Virginia VA N/A 2007
Sources:
Energy Information Administration
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Table 3.11: Triple Difference Results – Levels, Suspended States Robustness Checks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Baseline CA and AZ in 
Deregulated Group 
Dropping Suspended 
States 
    
Priv*Dereg*Postperiod -201,455* -170,663* -95,246 
 (106,320) (93,836) (73,987) 
Priv*Dereg -104,018 -132,471* -46,244 
 (68,282) (78,788) (55,437) 
Priv*Postperiod 184,424** 177,708** 100,578* 
 (84,331) (81,434) (59,507) 
Dereg*Postperiod 932.1 -29,628 810.6 
 (964.9) (19,594) (867.9) 
Private -56,682 -51,278 28,101 
 (65,267) (62,540) (31,375) 
Dereg 1,536 32,777 866.3 
 (1,052) (20,334) (753.0) 
Postperiod -2,667** 3,966 -1,021 
 (1,338) (3,420) (701.8) 
Peak Demand Summer 111.6*** 111.3*** 60.50*** 
 (37.93) (37.61) (18.66) 
Constant -6,145*** -13,433** -2,819*** 
 (2,342) (6,626) (1,073) 
    
Observations 50,352 50,352 47,219 
R-squared 0.299 0.300 0.255 
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: 
LHS variable is Energy Efficiency Total Annual Effects in MWh. 
Data are for the time period 1990 – 2011, excluding 1998 – 2001. 
Only utilities in all 18 years of the dataset are included in the sample. 
Column [1] presents baseline result equivalent to Column [2] in Table 6. 
Column [2] displays results when California and Arizona are included in listed of deregulated states. 
Column [3] shows results when states with “Suspended” deregulation activity are dropped from the 
dataset. 
 
 
 
  
94 
 
Table 3.12: Triple Difference Results – Natural Logs, Suspended States Robustness Checks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Baseline CA and AZ in 
Deregulated 
Group 
Dropping 
Suspended 
States 
    
Priv*Dereg*Postperiod -2.369*** -1.992*** -2.327*** 
 (0.651) (0.660) (0.685) 
Priv*Dereg 1.576** 1.229* 1.926*** 
 (0.667) (0.675) (0.692) 
Priv*Postperiod 0.519 0.435 0.481 
 (0.357) (0.359) (0.413) 
Dereg*Postperiod -0.0965* -0.468*** -0.0595 
 (0.0512) (0.118) (0.0506) 
Private 3.392*** 3.461*** 3.161*** 
 (0.430) (0.430) (0.456) 
Dereg -0.00763 0.372*** -0.00146 
 (0.0652) (0.112) (0.0648) 
Postperiod -0.0895*** -0.00735 -0.112*** 
 (0.0255) (0.0348) (0.0251) 
ln Peak Demand Summer 0.444*** 0.440*** 0.410*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0277) (0.0285) 
Constant -0.821*** -0.900*** -0.736*** 
 (0.0624) (0.0676) (0.0624) 
    
Observations 50,352 50,352 47,219 
R-squared 0.326 0.328 0.319 
Standard errors clustered by utility in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Notes: 
 LHS variable is ln (Energy Efficiency Total Annual Effects + 1). 
Data are for the time period 1990 – 2011, excluding 1998 – 2001. 
Only utilities in all 18 years of the dataset are included in the sample. 
Column [1] presents baseline result equivalent to Column [2] in Table 7. 
Column [2] displays results when California and Arizona are included in listed of deregulated 
states. 
Column [3] shows results when states with “Suspended” deregulation activity are dropped from 
the dataset. 
The control variable is ln (Peak Demand Summer + 1). 
 
  
95 
 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
 
  
Variable Mean
Treatment Control
Employment (Number of Workers) 287 386
Total Real Wages (10,000 Yuan) 2,443 3,615
Real Sales (10,000,000 Yuan) 39 42
Sales per Worker
(10,000,000 Yuan / Number of Workers)
0.16 0.14
Current Liability-Asset Ratio 1.77 1.65
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Table 4.2: Probit Model Results 
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Probit Model – 
Transition Ever 
  
Lagged ln sales 0.0454** 
 (0.0198) 
Lagged ln sales squared -0.0404*** 
 (0.00357) 
Lagged sales per worker 1.237*** 
 (0.129) 
Lagged sales per worker squared -0.232*** 
 (0.0372) 
Lagged current liability-asset ratio 0.0178** 
 (0.00742) 
Lagged current liability-asset ratio squared -0.000100 
 (8.95e-05) 
Lagged non-SOE region share -0.510 
 (0.707) 
Lagged non-SOE 3-digit industry share 17.02*** 
 (3.155) 
Non-SOE region delta 7.15e-06*** 
 (1.46e-06) 
Non-SOE 3-digit industry delta 0.000108*** 
 (2.28e-05) 
Constant -0.670 
 (0.527) 
 
Dummies for year 
Dummies for three-digit industry 
Dummies for region 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
0.1360 
 
Observations 16,542 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3: Difference-in-Differences Baseline Results 
 
 
Notes:  
Observed mean calculated as: 1
𝑛𝑛
∑ �(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇) − �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆��𝑛𝑛∈𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇  
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 500 repetitions. 
Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are represented by *, **, ***, respectively.  
 
  
ln(Employment)
Year (t) Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
Year of Transition -0.0757*** 0.0193 3.91 1,735
One Year after Transition -0.0668*** 0.0250 2.67 1,174
Two Years after Transition -0.0261 0.0301 0.87 910
ln(Real Wages)
Year (t) Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
Year of Transition -0.0715*** 0.0246 2.91 1,717
One Year after Transition -0.0633* 0.0332 1.91 1,161
Two Years after Transition -0.1042** 0.0414 2.52 900
ln(Sales per Worker)
Year (t) Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
Year of Transition 0.1094*** 0.0280 3.91 1,733
One Year after Transition 0.2577*** 0.0348 7.40 1,173
Two Years after Transition 0.2159*** 0.0406 5.32 909
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Table 4.4a: Difference-in-Differences Results, Starting Affiliation is Central or Provincial 
 
 
Notes:  
Observed mean calculated as: 1
𝑛𝑛
∑ �(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇) − �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆��𝑛𝑛∈𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇  
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 500 repetitions. 
Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are represented by *, **, ***, respectively. 
  
ln(Employment)
Year (t) Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
Year of Transition -0.1512** 0.0717 2.11 137
One Year after Transition -0.1353 0.1177 1.15 88
ln(Real Wages)
Year (t) Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
Year of Transition -0.0994 0.0945 1.05 137
One Year after Transition 0.0045 0.1450 0.03 87
ln(Sales per Worker)
Year (t) Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
Year of Transition 0.3353*** 0.0923 3.63 137
One Year after Transition 0.4618*** 0.1346 3.43 88
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Table 4.4b: Difference-in-Differences Results, Starting Affiliation is neither Central nor 
Provincial 
 
Notes:  
Observed mean calculated as: 1
𝑛𝑛
∑ �(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇) − �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆��𝑛𝑛∈𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇  
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 500 repetitions. 
Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are represented by *, **, ***, respectively. 
  
ln(Employment)
Year (t) Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
Year of Transition -0.0693*** 0.0191 3.63 1,598
One Year after Transition -0.0612** 0.0249 2.46 1,086
ln(Real Wages)
Year (t) Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
Year of Transition -0.0691*** 0.0265 2.60 1,580
One Year after Transition -0.0688** 0.0339 2.03 1,074
ln(Sales per Worker)
Year (t) Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
Year of Transition 0.0900*** 0.0285 3.16 1,580
One Year after Transition 0.2411*** 0.0354 6.81 1,085
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Table 4.5a: Difference-in-Differences Results, Starting Affiliation is Central, Provincial, or 
City and Prefecture 
 
 
Notes:  
Observed mean calculated as: 1
𝑛𝑛
∑ �(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇) − �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆��𝑛𝑛∈𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇  
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 500 repetitions. 
Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are represented by *, **, ***, respectively. 
  
ln(Employment)
Year (t) Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
Year of Transition -0.1549*** 0.0380 4.08 455
One Year after Transition -0.1548*** 0.0506 3.06 313
ln(Real Wages)
Year (t) Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
Year of Transition -0.1710*** 0.0458 3.73 454
One Year after Transition -0.1631*** 0.0620 2.63 312
ln(Sales per Worker)
Year (t) Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
Year of Transition 0.1340** 0.0574 2.34 455
One Year after Transition 0.3111*** 0.0616 5.05 313
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Table 4.5b: Difference-in-Differences Results, Starting Affiliation is neither Central, 
Provincial, nor City and Prefecture 
 
 
Notes:  
Observed mean calculated as: 1
𝑛𝑛
∑ �(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇) − �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖−1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆��𝑛𝑛∈𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇  
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 500 repetitions. 
Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels are represented by *, **, ***, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
ln(Employment)
Year (t) Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
Year of Transition -0.0476** 0.0199 2.39 1,280
One Year after Transition -0.0347 0.0296 1.17 861
ln(Real Wages)
Year (t) Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
Year of Transition -0.0357 0.0281 1.27 1,263
One Year after Transition -0.0266 0.0403 0.66 849
ln(Sales per Worker)
Year (t) Observed Mean Bootstrap Standard Error Z-Statistic Matched Pairs
Year of Transition 0.0986*** 0.0313 3.14 1,278
One Year after Transition 0.2383*** 0.0410 5.81 860
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